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Permanency is a pillar of child welfare law; children
generally do better with legally permanent caretakers than in
temporary foster care. Historically, when foster children
cannot reunify with their parents, states have sought to
terminate parental rights and find adoptive families. But recent
legal reforms have created a continuum of permanency
options, many of which permit ongoing legal relationships
with biological parents and do not require termination of
biological parents’ rights. Research has demonstrated that
such options are as lasting as adoption, and can help more
children leave foster care to legally permanent caretakers. This
continuum promises to empower families—especially children
and their new permanent caregivers—to determine the best
legal status for their particular situation. It also challenges a
reliance on terminations of parental rights as the default tool to
achieve permanency. This is the new permanency.
A milestone in the development of this new
permanency was the 2008 Fostering Connections to Success
and Increasing Adoptions Act (“Fostering Connections”),
which provided federal funds for kinship guardianship
subsidies. Yet six years after Fostering Connections, the
number of guardianships nationally has not increased - just as
many children grow up in foster care, and in many states
families have no greater ability to choose the best option for
them.
This article is the first to explore the reasons for
Fostering Connections’ failure to spark major changes. The
fault lies in Fostering Connections’ failure to challenge the
deep cultural and legal subordination of guardianship to
adoption and the discretion child welfare agencies have to
make core decisions in a case without significant court
oversight.
This article also explores a jurisdiction in which the
new permanency is close to reality. The District of Columbia
has seen the number of guardianships surpass the number of
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adoptions, with more children reaching permanency, and
fewer unnecessary terminations. The District thus represents
an extreme version of what the new permanency could do
nationally—although it also illustrates the problems with
overly wide agency discretion regarding kinship placements.
This article proposes a set of reforms that would help
fully implement the new permanency nationwide. These
reforms would rid the law of a hierarchy among permanency
options, establish a stronger and more consistent preference
for kinship placements, and empower families, not the state, to
select the permanency option that best fits their situation,
through more rigorous procedures and better provision of
quality counsel than current law provides.
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Permanency is a pillar of child welfare law. It has long
been agreed that children generally do better with legally
permanent caretakers, rather than in foster care, which is by
definition a temporary legal status. For the past several
decades, permanency options have mostly been assumed to be
limited to reunification with biological parents or adoption by
new parents. Adoption has been understood to require
termination of biological parental rights and of all legal
relationships between biological parent and child.
That binary—reunify or terminate and adopt—has
faced significant criticism for overly relying on terminations,
creating legal orphans,1 and unnecessarily excluding
permanency options which maintain a legal relationship
between parent and child or seek to place children
permanently with caretakers who did not want to adopt.
Assuming permanency required terminating parental rights,
many states terminated many thousands of parents’ rights, but
failed to find adoptive families for all children whose legal
relations with their parents were severed. This created legal
orphans, and critics complained that states served these
children poorly – states raise these children in foster care, then
“emancipate” them when they reach majority, and these
children fare poorly on important life outcomes.2 Critics
1

A legal orphan is a child whose biological parents remain alive, but who
has no legal parents because state action has terminated their biological
parents’ rights and the state has not formed a new parent-child relationship
via adoption. Martin Guggenheim coined the term. Martin Guggenheim,
The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental
Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two States,
29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 122 (1995).
2
See, e.g., MARK E. COURTNEY, ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE
ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 26,
6 (2011) (summarizing the “disquieting” conclusion that youth who
emancipate from foster care are “faring poorly . . . [a]cross a wide range of
outcome measures, including postsecondary educational attainment,
employment, housing stability, public assistance receipt, and criminal
justice
system
involvement
.
.
.
.”),
available
at
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explained how child welfare law subordinated permanency
options such as guardianship to adoption and demonstrated
empirically that guardianships are just as stable and lasting as
adoptions. Simultaneously, child welfare agencies began
placing increasing numbers of children with extended family
members, many of whom did not want to terminate their
relative’s parental rights, even if the kinship caregivers would
raise them to adulthood. And research demonstrated that
kinship care provided foster children with more stable
placements and facilitated better permanency outcomes.
The result has been significant changes in permanency
policies and, less significantly, in practice. Today, when foster
children cannot reunify with parents, their permanency
choices fall along a continuum: children can be adopted and
have their legal relationships with birth parents terminated;
children can be adopted and have court-enforceable rights to
visit with birth parents; children in one state can be adopted
without terminating birth parents’ rights (non-exclusive
adoption); children can live with a permanent guardian—
either a family member or close family friend (“kinship
guardianship” in child welfare jargon) or with others (nonkinship guardianship). This continuum represents a dramatic
shift in permanency law and should lead to dramatic shifts in
practice. Many options along this continuum do not require
terminations of parental rights and so this continuum
challenges reliance on terminations. Choosing among those
options requires delicate decision-making, and should
empower families—especially children and their new
permanent caregivers—to determine the best legal status for
their particular situation. This is the new permanency.
A milestone in the development of this new
permanency was the 2008 Fostering Connections to Success
and Increasing Adoptions Act (“Fostering Connections”).
http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/Midwest%20Evaluation_Repo
rt_4_10_12.pdf.
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Through Fostering Connections, Congress provided federal
funds to reimburse states for kinship guardianship subsidies.
This reform rectified a long-standing inequity in child welfare
law—the federal government had helped states pay adoption
subsidies for foster children since 1980, but had not done so
for guardianship. But as the permanency continuum developed
in the intervening decades, and as research firmly established
that guardianship was just as lasting and stable as adoption,
this inequity was increasingly untenable.
In an ideal world, Fostering Connections would have
ushered in the new permanency. Adoption and guardianship
would be treated as equal permanency options, which research
predicts would, most importantly, lead to improved
permanency outcomes overall as more children leave foster
care to guardianships. There may also be somewhat fewer
adoptions, because families would have a greater ability to
choose which legal status best suited their situation, and some
families would choose guardianship over adoption. Such
private family choice should be viewed as a normative good—
respecting the private ordering of family life as preferable to
state agencies or the law imposing their preferences on
families.
This ideal world has not been realized. Six years after
Fostering Connections, the number of guardianships and
adoptions remain roughly the same as they were in 2008.
Permanency outcomes have not improved, and in many states
families have no greater ability to choose the best option for
them than before 2008.
This article is the first to explore the reasons for
Fostering Connections’ failure to spark major practice
changes, to explore a jurisdiction in which the expected
changes appear to be taking shape, and to propose further legal
reforms to achieve Fostering Connections’ promise. Fostering
Connections failed to have as broad of an impact as possible
because of problems built into its structure. It provides federal
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funding for guardianship, but only for kinship caregivers—
even though non-kin caregivers may be just as willing to
choose guardianships. It requires states to rule out adoption
before being eligible for a guardianship subsidy, and thus
establishes a permanency hierarchy that subordinates
guardianship to adoption. This provision reinforces an
ideology that permanency requires something legally binding
and that adoption is more binding than guardianship because it
is legally hard to undo. This argument, however, ignores the
empirical reality that adoption and guardianship are equally
permanent.
The permanency hierarchy also reinforced a child
welfare legal culture that continues to subordinate
guardianship to adoption. Family courts nationally celebrate
“Adoption Day”—not “Guardianship Day” or “Permanent
Families Day.” State and federal agencies track detailed data
regarding adoptions, but only limited data regarding
guardianship. Reports about adoptions, but not guardianship,
are emphasized in policy briefs. Adoption remains the focus in
law school casebooks which describe guardianship as
something less than permanent, if they address it at all. And
the hierarchy is reinforced every time a case is litigated to
conclusion via adoption or guardianship. Adoption cases
involve terminations of parental rights, which trigger a host of
procedural protections due to the seriousness of the issues at
stake. Guardianships, in contrast, are treated as lesser cases,
often with lower standards of proof, less clear statutory
guidance, and often procedures from probate court rather than
family court.
Present law has also placed immense authority in child
welfare agencies. They determine when they will place
children with kin or with strangers, under what conditions they
will pay guardianship subsidies, and when they will inform
families that guardianship is an option. Court oversight of
these decisions is weak. Agencies’ wide discretion permits
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them to continue practicing under the old permanency—
without giving due deference to kinship placement
possibilities and continuing to subordinate guardianship as a
permanency option.
The District of Columbia provides a partial counternarrative. The District has more fully embraced equity
between adoption and guardianship, especially since it enacted
legislation in 2010 providing guardianship subsidies both for
kin and non-kin. Since then, the number of annual
guardianships has surpassed the number of adoptions, the
number of termination of parental rights filings has sharply
declined, and the number of foster children who emancipate
from foster care rather than leave to permanent families has
declined. District foster children appear to be getting better
permanency outcomes to fit their particular situations, with
fewer unnecessary terminations. The District thus represents
the promise of what the new permanency could do nationally,
albeit with a somewhat extreme balance between
guardianships and adoptions.
The District, however, also illustrates one national
obstacle to the new permanency—the wide agency discretion
and limited judicial review of kinship placement decisions
early in cases. This has led to a series of cases reversing
adoption decrees due to the child welfare agencies’ failure to
consider a potential kinship placement adequately. Because
agency placement decisions are not easily challenged early in
cases, these cases have undone adoptions granted after
children lived for years in one foster home—a result that
would be unnecessary if the issue were resolved early in a
case.
This article proposes a set of reforms that would help
fully implement the new permanency nationwide, achieving
the benefits and avoiding the pitfalls evident in the District of
Columbia. First and most obviously, the law should no longer
impose a hierarchy among permanency options and should
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instead treat adoptions and guardianships as equal. Adoption
should not need to be ruled out before guardianship subsidies
are provided. When reunification is not an option, all potential
permanent caregivers should understand the full continuum of
permanency options available to them. The law should provide
similar procedural and substantive protections to the parentchild relationship before guardianships as are provided before
adoptions. And agencies and policy makers should track
adoption and guardianship data more equitably.
If any hierarchy exists, it should reflect the better
outcomes that children have in kinship rather than stranger
foster care. The law should establish a strong kinship care
preference, requiring agencies to place children with kin
unless the agency can establish good cause why that would be
unsafe or otherwise detrimental to the child. And children and
parents should be able to challenge that decision in court early
in a case, rather than leaving the issue to nearly unfettered
agency discretion. Such reforms could increase the number of
children benefitting from kinship care, resolve disputes over
kinship care placements early, and avoid the litigation
challenges evident in the District.
The law should also place greater emphasis on the
selection of permanency plans to ensure the best option is
chosen. Making that choice correctly is essential because it
will shape the negotiating field that will lead many parents and
caregivers to reach agreement on one option along the
permanency continuum. More effective procedures—
including evidentiary hearings in appropriate situations and
the right to an expedited appeal of permanency hearing
decisions—will achieve this goal.
Finally, to facilitate all of the above, a greater
emphasis on quality counsel for parents, children, and, once
reunification is ruled out, potential permanent caregivers is
essential. Quality representation for parents and children can
speed permanency by helping parties negotiate permanency
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agreements by consent, and by ensuring all options on the
permanency continuum are explored. The same is true for
counsel for caregivers, who can ensure that all caregivers are
aware of all possible permanency outcomes, even if individual
caseworkers are loath to share such information with foster
families.
I.
The New Permanency: A Continuum of
Permanency Options, with an Emphasis on Kinship Care,
and with a Relatively Limited Need for Terminations of
Parental Rights
Foster care is by definition temporary, and the law now
recognizes that permanent legal connections between children
and their caregivers lead to better outcomes. Such connections
protect the bonds that develop between children and
caregivers, and permit those bonds to strengthen, while
simultaneously protecting children from the risks inherent in
temporary foster care—such as frequent placement
disruptions. It is thus essential that foster children leave foster
care to some permanent legal status quickly. That status is
most frequently reunification, in which children return home
to a parent or parents, whose full custody rights are restored.
But when that cannot occur, some kind of permanent legal
status with a non-parent is required; child welfare law
explicitly disfavors any other option.3
The central importance of permanency has been
codified in federal child welfare law since 1980.4 When
3

Federal law has long disfavored any plan that would lead to long-term
foster care, now known in child welfare jargon as “another planned
permanent living arrangement.” In fall 2014, Congress banned such longterm foster care plans as a condition of federal funding to states for all
children under 16. Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families
Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, § 112 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C)(i)
(2011)).
4
For a brief history of the “permanency planning” movement leading to
this codification, see Mark Testa, New Permanency Strategies for Children
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children and parents cannot reunify, the law has long
recognized adoption and guardianship (or some other form of
custody) as the available permanency options.
Between those permanency options, however, lies an
increasingly complicated continuum that is difficult to reduce
to a simple choice of adoption or guardianship. Subsidized
guardianship—in which a foster parent gains permanent
custody of a child and receives a subsidy from the child
welfare agency to help support the child, and the parent retains
a right to visit with the child and the legal identity as the
child’s parent—is a permanency option that does not
necessitate termination of parental rights. Subsidized
guardianship is available in a majority of states for kinship
foster parents, and in many states for all foster parents.
Adoption comes with increasing variations—traditional
exclusive adoption, adoption with post-adoption contact
agreements (in the majority of states), and even now nonexclusive adoption (in California), in which no termination is
required.
This continuum is the core of the new permanency,
and it should be embraced for multiple reasons. First, research
shows that more permanency options will help more children
leave temporary foster care to legally permanent families.
Second, more choices help families select the legal status that
best fits their situation. Different legal statuses can better
reflect the variety of relationships that foster children have
with their biological parents. When such parents are so
harmful that any ongoing relationship will damage the child,
their rights should be terminated. But in many cases,
children’s ongoing bonds should be preserved, counseling
in Foster Care, in CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH: ADVANCES FOR PRACTICE
AND POLICY 108, 111–12 (Duncan Lindsey & Aron Shlonsky eds., 2008)
[hereinafter “Testa, New Permanency Strategies”]; Mark Hardin, Child
Protection Cases in a Unified Family Court, 32 FAM. L.Q. 147, 151–52
(1998).
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against terminations of parental rights and in favor of ongoing
contact rights. Relatedly, more permanency choices can help
limit the overuse of terminations and thus the creation of legal
orphans. Third, the permanency continuum can shift power
from child welfare agencies to families to determine which
legal status is best for them—following the welcome trend in
family law of empowering families to order their private
relationships.5
This section will explore the permanency continuum,
including the varieties of guardianship and adoption, and the
rigorous research establishing the benefits of guardianship. It
will then explore the connection between these expanded
permanency options and the growth of kinship foster care;
research into kinship care identifies a close relationship
between kinship care and good permanency outcomes—
making the process for placing foster children with kin
particularly important for achieving these outcomes.
A.

The Permanency Continuum

When a foster child cannot reunify with a parent, the
permanency discussion is no longer simply a matter of
terminating parental rights and finding an adoptive family.
Rather, a continuum of permanency options now exists.6 All
options endow a new caretaker with day-to-day control of the
child and authority to make decisions for the child, but vary in
whether the caretaker is legally considered a parent (as in
adoption) or not (as in guardianship). The options vary in what
5

Infra Part II.E.3.
The phrase “permanency continuum” is now used within the child
welfare field. E.g., National Resource Center for Permanency and Family
Connections, Re-Visiting the Adoption-Guardianship Discussion: Helping
Caseworkers Better Understand and Communicate the Permanency
Implications of Adoption and Guardianship, Feb. 20, 2014, Slide 2,
http://spaulding.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ReVisitingTheAdoptionGuardianshipDiscussion.pdf (last visited 10 Nov.
2014).
6
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relationship, if any, they maintain between children and their
biological parents. In some cases, biological parents retain the
legal status (but not the authority) of a parent, visitation, or
other contact rights, while traditional exclusive adoption
severs the entire legal relationship between parent and child,
including all contact rights.
This permanency continuum can help shift focus on
the proper role of terminations of parental rights. Present law
emphasizes terminations as a default path towards
permanency, specifically, to traditional, exclusive adoption.7
For at least three decades, there has been a vigorous debate
about the policy wisdom of this focus. Does it create legal
orphans? Does it help more children be adopted? Some
scholars challenged the notion that terminations should be a
widely used tool at all, even if children cannot reunify.8 Others
argued that increasing terminations would likely create more
legal orphans.9 Other scholars argued that present law does not
7

Present law requires states to file termination cases when children have
been in foster care for a certain amount of time and sets adoption as the
default permanency plan after reunification. Infra notes 113–117 and
accompanying text.
8
E.g., Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 423 (1983).
9
Martin Guggenheim found that as authorities in New York and Michigan
increased the speed and frequency with which they terminated parental
rights, adoptions increased, but that the number of terminations and legal
orphans increased even more. Guggenheim, supra note 1, at 126–34. More
recent studies have similarly found that, since the 1997 Adoption and Safe
Families Act (ASFA), the number of legal orphans created every year has
increased to roughly 20,000. Richard Barth, Adoption from Foster Care: A
Chronicle of the Years After ASFA, in INTENTIONS AND RESULTS: A LOOK
BACK AT THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 64, 65 (Center for the
Study
of
Social
Policy,
Urban
Institute,
2009),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001351_safe_families_act.pdf. The
number of adoptions of foster children also increased in the years after
ASFA, but multiple critics have argued that faster terminations of parental
rights have not resulted in that. E.g., Brenda D. Smith, After Parental
Rights Are Terminated: Factors Associated with Exiting Foster Care, 25

06 GUPTA_MACRO FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

16

UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy

3/11/2015 12:55 PM

Vol. 19:1

encourage enough terminations—leaving too many
exceptions, and giving unfit biological parents with poor
rehabilitation prospects too much time to seek reunification.10
Embedded in this debate was the assumption that terminations
were inextricably linked with permanency.
The permanency continuum has complicated the
connection between terminations and permanency. Rather than
“permanency” being code for terminating parental rights and
adoption, the field now has begun to recognize a “permanency
continuum.”11 This continuum involves a variety of options to
achieve permanency, some of which require termination and
some of which do not. Empirical research has demonstrated
that options which do not require terminations lead to
caregiving relationships that last just as long as traditional
adoptions. This continuum of equally permanent options
suggests that moving to permanency should not by default
require terminations.
This section will survey the options within the new
permanency. It will also explore the evidence establishing the
widespread attraction of those options to many families.
Moreover, this section will explore the evidence establishing
that guardianships provide permanency that is just as secure,
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 965, 979 (2003); Richard P. Barth et al.,
The State Construction of Families: Foster Care, Termination of Parental
Rights, and Adoption: From Anticipation to Evidence: Research on the
Adoption of Safe Families Act, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 371, 397
(2005).
10
ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 193–96 (1999).
11
Children’s Defense Fund, Child Trends, American Bar Association
Center on Children and the Law, Casey Family Programs, Child Focus,
and Generations United, Making It Work: Using the Guardianship
Assistance Program (GAP) to Close the Permanency Gap for Children in
Foster Care, 3 (2012) [hereinafter Making It Work], available at
http://www.childrensdefense.org/child-research-datapublications/data/making-it-work-using-the.pdf (last visited Feb. 10,
2014).
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lasting, and safe for children as adoption. These empirical
realities suggest the contours of a new permanency—in which
terminations are not a default option, and in which families
have freedom to choose which legal status fits them best.
1.
Permanency Without
Termination: Expansion of
Guardianship
Guardianship grants legal custody to a non-parent—
typically, the foster parent or other custodian who has raised
the child for some period of time—without terminating the
legal relationship between parent and child. The parent
typically retains a right to visit with the child, and some other
residual rights such as the right to determine the child’s
religion.12 Like a custody case between parents, the parties can
later move the court to modify or terminate the guardianship
due to significant changed circumstances.13
Guardianships have long been an option in child
welfare cases. They use a legal concept with a longer
American legal history than adoption, and which has been
cited in child welfare literature since at least the 1930s.14 The
two major modern federal child welfare funding statutes, the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, both recognize
guardianship.15
12

E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2389(c) (2001).
E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2395(a) (“Any party may move the court to
modify, terminate, or enforce a guardianship order . . . .”), § 16-2395(d)
(2001) (requiring proof of “a substantial and material change in the child’s
circumstances . . . and that it is in the child’s best interests to modify or
terminate the guardianship order”).
14
Mark F. Testa & Jennifer Miller, Evolution of Private Guardianship as a
Child Welfare Resource, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A
HANDBOOK OF PRACTICES, POLICIES, AND PROGRAMS 405 (Gerald P.
Mallon & Meg McCartt Hess, eds. 2005).
15
Pub. L. 96-272, § 101(a)(1) (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B)
13

06 GUPTA_MACRO FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

18

UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy

3/11/2015 12:55 PM

Vol. 19:1

Despite this history, guardianships were infrequently
used until the 1990s, especially because neither states nor the
federal government offered subsidies to guardians. In contrast,
adoptive parents could obtain subsidies, creating strong
financial incentives to pursue adoption and not guardianship.16
That funding difference flowed from a policy preference
(discussed in Part II) for adoption as somehow more
permanent than, or otherwise preferable to, guardianship.17
Guardianship became more popular in the 1990s,
nearly doubling in number.18 Child welfare agencies faced
dramatically larger numbers of foster children living with
kinship caregivers, many of whom resisted adopting the
children out of opposition to terminating their family
member’s parental rights. Agencies turned to guardianship to
help such children leave foster care.19 Many states began
offering guardianship subsidies without federal assistance, and
several received federal waivers to allow them to use federal
dollars to help pay for such subsidies. The number of states
with subsidized guardianship increased from only six in 1996
to more than 30 in 2004.20 Finally, in 2008, Congress enacted

(2011)), requiring states to regularly review cases to determine when “the
child may be returned to … the home or placed for adoption or legal
guardianship”); Pub. L. 105-89, §§ 101(b) & 302 (1997) (defining
guardianship and listing guardianship as a possible permanency plan).
16
See Meryl Schwartz, Reinventing Guardianship: Subsidized
Guardianship, Foster Care, and Child Welfare, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC.
CHANGE 441, 457 (1996).
17
Testa & Miller, supra note 14, at 407–08.
18
Testa, New Permanency Strategies, supra note 4, at 116. Just as the
number of guardianships increased, so did the number of children
discharged from foster care to live with relatives, often via custody or
some legal status like guardianship. Id.
19
Infra Part I.B.
20
Eliza Patten, The Subordination of Subsidized Guardianship in Child
Welfare Proceedings, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, 257 (2004).
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Fostering Connections, which provided federal support to
states offering kinship guardianship subsidies.21
Fostering Connections signaled a new prominence for
subsidized guardianship. At least 37 states plus the District of
Columbia now offer a subsidized kinship guardianship.22
Eight of those states have established new programs since
Fostering Connections,23 and the federal funds provided by
Fostering Connections make it easier for the other states to
offer subsidized guardianship. The intervening years should,
therefore, have seen a significant increase in the number of
guardianships or in the ratio of guardianships to adoptions—
but that has not occurred nationally. I will address that
phenomenon in Part II, and focus here on what options now
exist.
Subsidized guardianship has several benefits. Most
importantly, it increases the number of children who leave
foster care to permanent families. Several jurisdictions have
studied their guardianship programs rigorously, with families
randomly assigned to either a control group (in which
subsidized guardianship was not an option) or a demonstration
group (in which subsidized guardianship was an option).24
21

Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act, Pub. L.
110-351, § 101(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 673(d) (2012)).
22
Making It Work, supra note 11, at 3.
23
Id. at 6.
24
The jurisdictions are the states of Illinois and Tennessee, and
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Although subsidized guardianship is available in
many more jurisdictions, supra note 16, I focus on these states because of
the rigor of their experimental design. For the importance of relying on
rigorously designed evaluations, see Mark F. Testa, Evaluation of Child
Welfare Interventions, in FOSTERING ACCOUNTABILITY: USING EVIDENCE
TO GUIDE AND IMPROVE CHILD WELFARE POLICY 195 (Mark F. Testa &
John Poertner eds. 2010) [hereinafter Testa, Evaluation of Interventions].
Less rigorous evaluations lead to similar results. For instance, a study of
guardianship in California tentatively concluded that guardianship lead to
“substantially greater” numbers of children leaving foster care to
permanent families. CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVS., REPORT TO THE
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Each found a significant increase in the overall permanency
rate—that is, the proportion of foster children who leave
temporary foster care to a legally permanent family—ranging
from 5.5 percent to 19.9 percent.25
A second benefit of guardianship is that it does not
require termination of parental rights, or of the legal
relationship between parents and children.26 Both children and
foster parents who supported guardianship cited the ongoing
relationship with biological parents as a reason to choose
guardianship over adoption.27 Many biological parents, of
course, prefer a permanency option that does not terminate
their legal relationship with their children.28 Much social
science and legal research has concluded that terminating a
legal relationship between parent and child harms the child—
even when parents are so dysfunctional that they cannot raise
the child. Research has concluded that children with strong,
ongoing bonds with parents, especially older children, benefit
from ongoing relationships with their parents; and that
children can bond closely with their caretaker without
severing their relationship with parents—strong bonds with
LEGISLATURE ON THE KINSHIP GUARDIANSHIP ASSISTANCE PAYMENT
PROGRAM, 5 (2006).
25
The difference was 5.5 percent in Illinois. Testa, Evaluation of
Interventions, supra note 24, at 199. The difference was 19.9 percent in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and 15.1 percent in Tennessee. Id. at 201. See also
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Admin. for Children and
Families, Admin. on Children, Youth and Families, Children’s Bureau,
Synthesis of Findings: Subsidized Guardianship Child Welfare Waiver
Demonstrations, 15–16 (2011) [hereinafter Synthesis of Findings],
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/subsidized_0.pdf
(summarizing data).
26
Making It Work, supra note 11, at 3 (listing “[d]oes not require the
termination of parental rights for children who have relationships with
parents who cannot care for them” as one of several “benefits” to
guardianship).
27
Synthesis of Findings, supra note 25, at 24.
28
Carol Sanger, Bargaining for Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation
Agreements, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 321–22 (2012).

06 GUPTA_MACRO FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2015

The New Permanency

3/11/2015 12:55 PM

21

multiple caregivers is not only possible, but healthy and
normal.29
Avoiding unnecessary terminations of parental rights
also avoids state-created legal orphans—children who have no
legal parent (because the state terminated their birth parents’
rights) and who grow up in foster care without adoption by
new parents. State data has consistently shown that states
terminate parental rights to thousands more children every
year than are created through adoptions.30 Empirical research
has also shown that termination-focused policies significantly
increase the number of legal orphans.31 A permanency option
like guardianship that does not require termination does not,
by definition, risk creating legal orphans.
Procedurally, the absence of termination plays out in
two ways. First, avoiding termination may induce biological
parents to consent to a guardianship petition, and thus lead to a
faster and less contentious legal process. This both leads to
faster permanency and, more importantly, avoids the harm that
can come from ongoing litigation—both anxiety imposed on
the child and family and tensions between adults, all of whom
may maintain a relationship with the children.32 Second, the
lack of a termination has led many states to provide fewer
29

Patten, supra note 20, at 240–44 (collecting and discussing research).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION (FFY 2002-FFY 2012)
1 (2013) [hereinafter TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION], available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/trends_fostercare_
adoption2012.pdf (reporting total numbers of terminations and adoptions
of foster children for the previous decade).
31
Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of Parental Rights of children in Foster Care—An Empirical
Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 132-34 (1995).
32
Josh Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adoption and Child Welfare, 67 ALA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015); see also Patten, supra note 20, at 248
(“Contested legal proceedings of any kind are disruptive to children and
may negatively impact children both directly and indirectly.”).
30

06 GUPTA_MACRO FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

22

UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy

3/11/2015 12:55 PM

Vol. 19:1

procedural protections for parents who do not consent to a
guardianship than they provide to parents in termination and
adoption cases.33
Guardianship also helps families select the best option
for their situation. The empirical record shows that offering
guardianship causes a substitution effect—some families that
would have adopted foster children if adoption were the only
option instead choose guardianship. The longest study to date
followed Illinois families for ten years and showed for nearly
15 percent of families, offering guardianship led them to
choose that option over adoption. In the control group—in
which a foster or kinship family could only choose adoption—
74.9 percent of children were adopted.34 But in the
experimental group—in which families could choose adoption
or guardianship—only 60.2 percent of children were
adopted.35 A controlled experiment in Tennessee revealed a
larger impact, with 24.6 percent fewer adoptions in the group
of families for whom guardianship was an option.36
Such a substitution effect ought to create no concerns,
given guardianship’s record both in helping more children
33

Infra Part II.D.
Testa, Evaluation of Interventions, supra note 24, at 204. See also Mark
F. Testa, The Quality of Permanence—Lasting or Binding? Subsidized
Guardianship and Kinship Foster Care as Alternatives to Adoption, 12
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 519–20 (2005) (describing Illinois results)
[hereinafter Testa, Quality of Permanence].
35
Testa, Evaluation of Interventions, supra note 24, at 204.
36
Id. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the group offered guardianship had 2.4
percent more adoptions. Id. But in Milwaukee the foster care agency
declined to tell families already moving towards adoption that
guardianship was even an option—thus depriving those families of the
information necessary to produce a substitution effect. Mark F. Testa,
Subsidized Guardianship: Testing the Effectiveness of an Idea Whose Time
Has Finally Come 20 (2008) [hereinafter Testa, Subsidized Guardianship],
available
at
http://www.nrcpfc.org/is/downloads/SG_Testing%20Effectiveness%20(Te
sta%202008).pdf (last visited 10 Nov. 2014).
34
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leave foster care to permanent families, and in creating
families that are just as permanent as adoption. It suggests that
not offering guardianship pushes families into a legal status
that they view as less desirable than guardianship.
Presenting families with both adoption and
guardianship as options has instrumental benefits as well.
Research reveals that families felt “more comfortable about
broaching the topic of permanence when both adoption and
guardianships were put on the table than when termination of
parental rights was posed as the only alternative to
reunification.”37 Giving families the choice between
permanency options thus likely leads to greater investment
from family members in whatever choice they ultimately
make. For families who ultimately desire adoption but are
hesitant, guardianship can serve as a stepping stone; such
caregivers first become guardians and later adopt.38
Historically, guardianship faced concerns that it would
prove less permanent for children because, unlike adoption, it
was subject to modification motions.39 “Adoption hawks”
insisted on a clear rule-out of adoption before even discussing
guardianship with families, while “guardianship doves”
objected to any such hierarchy.40 The empirical record
unequivocally rejects this concern; one scholar concludes
there is now “overwhelming agreement from child-welfare
experts that legal guardianship is a promising permanency
outcome.”41 In a rigorous study with a large sample size and
37

Testa, New Permanency Strategies, supra note 4, at 116–17.
Making It Work, supra note 11, at 12–13.
39
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON KINSHIP FOSTER CARE (2000)
(describing concerns about guardianship’s long-term stability and how
choosing guardianship over adoption “may be seen as less than a total
commitment to permanency”).
40
Testa, Subsidized Guardianship, supra note 36, at 6–7.
41
Sarah Katz, The Value of Permanency: State Implementation of Legal
38
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randomized control and experimental groups, Mark Testa, a
leading social work scholar of guardianship, found that only
2.2 percent of 6,820 children living with guardians had a
placement disruption or otherwise had their guardianship
terminated, and some of these children left their guardians to
reunify with their parents.42 Offering guardianship to families
does not affect the likelihood that a child’s placement with a
family will disrupt either while the child is formally a foster
child or after a court enters a guardianship or adoption order.43
Matching families in the experimental group who chose
guardianship to similar families in the control group who
pursued adoption, Testa found “no evidence of any adverse
impact on the long-term stability of the living arrangement”
from guardianship.44 A California study reported slightly
larger, but still small levels of guardianship disruptions—
nothing to undermine the “substantially greater” permanency
rates that guardianship catalyzed, as compared with offering
only adoption as a permanency option.45 Summarizing all
available data in 2011, the federal government wrote that
children in guardianships have living arrangements just as
stable as in other legal statuses, and that no significant

Guardianship Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1079, 1090 (2013).
42
MARK F. TESTA ET AL., ILLINOIS SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP WAIVER
DEMONSTRATION: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT 50 (2003). These figures
exclude guardianships, which ended due to the death or incapacitation of
the guardian.
43
Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 34, at 526–27.
44
Testa, Subsidized Guardianship, supra note 36, at 23–24, 25.
45
CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON
THE KINSHIP GUARDIANSHIP ASSISTANCE PAYMENT (KIN-GAP) PROGRAM
5 (2006). The study found that 5.9 percent of children who left foster care
to subsidized guardianship subsequently re-entered foster care. The study
cautioned that some of these re-entries might be “positive”—such as a reentry to facilitate reunification with a parent. Id. at 15.

06 GUPTA_MACRO FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2015

The New Permanency

3/11/2015 12:55 PM

25

differences existed in the number of children who re-entered
foster care.46
Pursuing adoptions in place of guardianships is no
guarantor of stability. Like guardianships, adoptions are quite
stable if achieved—one study found only 3.3 percent of all
adopted children to have spent any time in foster care in the
four years since a court finalized their adoption.47 But
adoption disruptions—in which a child leaves a pre-adoptive
home before finalization—occur with more frequency.48
Different studies have quantified disruption rates differently,
with most ranging from 9 to 15 percent.49 Disruptions of preadoptive placements are as high as 25 percent in at least one
jurisdiction.50 Reviewing the literature, Trudy Festinger notes
that disruption rates have increased in recent decades as the
number of adoptions—especially those of older children and
children with special needs—has increased;51 and that the
disruption rate for older children is “roughly 25 percent.”52
These disruption statistics should only suggest the obvious
point that it is difficult for foster care agencies to place
children with greater needs permanently, and that working
towards an adoption—especially an adoption with a new
family—is no panacea for many foster youth.

46

Synthesis of Findings, supra note 25, at 18–20.
Trudy Festinger, After Adoption: Dissolution or Permanence?, 81 CHILD
WELFARE 515, 527 (2002).
48
Trudy Festinger, Adoption Disruption: Rates, Correlates, and Service
Needs, in CHILD WELFARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 452, 452–53 (Gerald P.
Mallon & Peg McCartt Hess eds. 2005) [hereinafter Festinger, Adoption
Disruption].
49
Id. at 453–56 (summarizing studies).
50
The District of Columbia reports a 0.25 to 1 ratio of placement changes
to total placements for pre-adoptive placements. 2013 D.C. CHILD AND
FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY ANN. PUB. REP. 25 (2014) [hereinafter CFSA,
2013 ANNUAL REPORT ].
51
Festinger, Adoption Disruption, supra note 48, at 456.
52
Id. at 457.
47
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The empirical record also shows no significant
differences in well-being—measured by school performance
and risky behaviors—between children who leave foster care
to guardianship and to adoption.53 The differences that exist
are between children who remain in foster care and those who
leave to permanent families; the legal status of permanent
families does not appear to affect child well-being.54
a. Kinship and Non-kinship
Guardianship
Guardianship is an option for both kinship and nonkinship foster families, but is most frequently discussed as a
permanency option appropriate for kinship placements.
Fostering Connections codified this kinship focus by limiting
federally supported guardianship subsidies to kin.55 Federal
law permits an exception to the rule requiring termination of
parental rights motions after 15 months in foster care for
relative placements only—implying that other placements are
not good candidates for this exception, even if such
placements are eligible for guardianships and, thus, do not
require terminations.56 And the academic and policy discourse
has generally framed guardianship as a permanency option for
kin.57 There is a real connection between kinship placements
53

Id. at 20.
Id.
55
42 U.S.C. § 673(d). Under administrative guidance from the federal
Children’s Bureau, states have wide discretion to define the term “relative”
broadly, and to include “fictive kin” such as godparents, family friends,
former step-parents (or step-grandparents), and the like. U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ACYF-CB-PI-10-11, PROGRAM INSTRUCTION 14
(2010) [hereinafter PROGRAM INSTRUCTION 10-11], available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/pi1011.pdf. Still, even such a
broad definition would likely exclude a foster parent with whom the child
and family have no relationship prior to the child’s placement.
56
42 U.S.C § 675(E)(i).
57
Mark Testa, one of the leading scholars of and policy advocates for
54
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and permanency, for reasons explored throughout this
article.58 Historically, subsidized guardianship developed in
part as a response to large numbers of foster children in
kinship care.59 And children placed with kin have more stable
placements and are more likely to leave foster care to some
kind of legally permanent status.60
Despite the focus on kinship guardianship,
guardianship statutes are generally not limited to kin, so any
foster parent can seek guardianship.61 Obtaining subsidized
guardianship presents a more mixed picture across the states.
Federal law does limit federally supported guardianship
subsidy payments to guardians identified by state child
guardianship, has framed the issue as between adoption and “legal
guardianship by kin.” Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 34, at 528
(emphasis added). See also id. at 509–10 (describing discussions regarding
Illinois’ guardianship waiver program as related to kinship placements).
See also CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 129 (2014) (“Guardianship is
particularly appropriate for older children who do not want to sever ties
with their parents but who cannot return home and for kinship caregivers
who, for a variety of reasons, do not want to adopt.”). Many advocacy
organizations explicitly link guardianship and kinship care, even though
guardianship is available more broadly, and did so leading up to the
Fostering Connections Act—ignoring non-kinship guardianship as an
option for federal advocacy. E.g., Child Welfare League of America,
Kinship Care and Assisted Guardianship (2007), available at
http://66.227.70.18/advocacy/2008legagenda08.htm (last visited 17 Nov.
2014); Jim Casey Youth Opportunities Initiative, Subsidized Guardianship
and Kinship Care, http://jimcaseyyouth.org/subsidized-guardianship-andkinship-care (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).
58
E.g., infra Parts I.B & II.E.
59
Infra Part I.B.
60
Id.
61
The federal statutory definition of guardianship is not limited to kin. 42
U.S.C. § 675(7). States with foster care specific guardianship statutes
generally are not limited to kin. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2382(a)(4) (2001)
(defining “permanent guardian” without a kinship limitation). The same is
true in states that use guardianship statutes in their probate codes. E.g.,
MO. REV. STAT. § 475.010(7) (West 2014) (same).
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welfare agencies as kin.62 But many states and the District of
Columbia (26 by one count) offer guardianship subsidies with
state funds to families that do not qualify for federal funds,63
and most of these offer subsidized guardianship to non-kin.64
These non-kinship subsidies reflect a core purpose of
guardianship—to avoid terminations of parental rights and
thereby respect the ongoing relationships between foster
children and their biological parents. It may also help nonkinship foster parents retain their identity, and prevent
unnecessary termination litigation. One child whom I
represented in the District of Columbia left foster care to a
non-kinship guardianship shortly after the District extended
guardianship subsidies to non-kin guardianship. His foster
parents had refused to adopt him. They were in their young
sixties and my client (in his pre-teens) called them “grandma”
and “grandpa.” They explained that they felt that these were
the right names for them, and that they simply did not see
themselves as “mom” and “dad.”65 When non-kinship
subsidized guardianship became they law, they jumped at the
chance. My client’s parents, knowing they would likely face
62

Supra note 555521, at 14.
Making It Work, supra note 11, at 7.
64
Patten, supra note 20, at 259. Such states include: the District of
Columbia, which opened guardianship subsidies to non-kin in 2010, infra
note 226; Illinois, 89 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 302.410(c)(2); Iowa, IOWA
ADMIN. CODE R. 441-204.2(1)(e)(2); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 722.874(Sec. 4)(2); Montana, MONT. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS., POLICY MANUAL: LEGAL
PROCEDURE STATE SUBSIDIZED (GENERAL FUND) GUARDIANSHIP,
http://www.dphhs.mt.gov/cfsd/cfsdmanual/407-3.pdf, at 1–2; Washington,
WASH. REV. STAT. 13.36.090.
65
My client’s foster parent’s self-identification as permanent caregivers
other than parents is consistent with the kinship guardianship literature,
which reports many kinship caregivers who wish to “retain their extended
family identities” rather than adopt the legal identity of a parent. Testa,
Quality of Permanence, supra note 34, at 505; Jesse L. Thornton,
Permanency Planning for Children in Kinship Foster Homes, 70 CHILD
WELFARE 593, 597 (1991).
63
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(and lose) a termination petition, consented to the foster
parents’ guardianship petition. My client soon had legal
permanency that respected both his ongoing relationship with
his mother and other biological family members, and his
guardians’ identity.
Still, non-kinship guardianship is not emphasized on
par with either adoption or kinship guardianship. Testa has
suggested that kinship guardianship and adoption are equally
good permanency options, but argues differently for non-kin.
“Adoption is the conventional means of establishing a kinship
relationship in the absence of blood ties,” he argues, so unless
it is necessary to respect older children’s desires or if there are
no legal grounds to terminate parental rights, non-kinship
guardianship is inappropriate.66 This argument ignores core
values of guardianship, which apply equally to non-kin—the
preservation of valuable parent-child relationships, respect for
foster parents’ identities regarding the child, and avoidance of
unnecessary termination litigation. Which legal status is
“conventional” does not define what is best for a particular
family. Moreover, adoption is the conventional means of
establishing kinship ties only because the law, child welfare
agencies, and family courts made it so throughout the 20th
century, and that convention is not sacrosanct.
More open attitudes to non-kinship guardianship
would likely find a receptive audience, as the empirical record
suggests non-kinship foster parents are likely to be as attracted
to guardianship as kinship foster parents. In Illinois—which
offers subsidized guardianship to kinship and non-kinship
foster parents, more kinship foster parents obtained
guardianship than non-kin. Yet when studies controlled for
differences between children placed with kinship and nonkinship foster parents—such as age, race, disability, etc.—the
differences shrank. Kinship foster parents were still more
66

Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 34, at 531.
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interested in guardianship than non-kinship foster parents, but
the difference was not statistically significant.67 Interest levels
in guardianship need not be equal between kin and non-kin to
make the point—significant numbers of non-kin foster parents
are interested in guardianship, and that permanency option is
an important element of the new permanency.
This conclusion has potentially far-reaching
implications because guardianship is presented in federal law
and much policy discourse as an option for kin only.68
Recognizing that non-kinship foster parents may also have
interest in guardianship could significantly increase the
number of children who leave foster care to guardianship. This
may help explain recent trends in the District of Columbia,
discussed in Part III.
2.
A Permanency
Continuum Even Within
Adoption
Although child welfare policy makers tend to discuss
adoption as a singular topic, adoptions now exist on a
continuum, with the option of pursuing a traditional closed
adoption, an adoption with contact agreement, or, in
California, a non-exclusive adoption. This adoption continuum
remains inadequately appreciated in child welfare law.
Historically adoption was viewed as the statutory
formation of families—especially infertile couples adopting
infants. The law was structured to make adoptive families as
similar as possible to “natural” families—going so far as to
require the legal fiction of printing new birth certificates
67

Testa, Evaluation of Interventions, supra note 24, at 208.
Federal law limits guardianship subsidies to kin, 42 U.S.C. § 673(d), and
creates an exception to the 15 of 22 month termination rule for relative
placements only—implying that other placements are not good candidates
for guardianships and thus require terminations. 42 U.S.C § 675(E)(i). The
academic and policy discourse has also focused on guardianship as related
to kin only. Supra note 5757.
68
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claiming that adoptive children were born to the adoptive
parents, and writing the birth parents out of the child’s legal
history, relegating them to sealed court or agency files.69 In
the child welfare setting, this view of adoption meant
adoptions and terminations of parental rights were inextricably
linked, and no ongoing role for the biological parents was
envisioned.
Adoption is quite dramatically different now,
especially as adoption occurs in the child welfare system.
Most fundamentally, adoption is more open, with dramatically
more contacts between adopted children, adoptive parents, and
biological parents. Almost 40 percent of all non-kinship
adoptive parents report that their child had some post-adoption
contact with birth families.70 This fairly high rate occurs for
both ideological and demographic reasons. Ideologically, our
society has recognized a growing “consensus . . . that greater
openness offers an array of benefits for adoptees.”71
Demographically, many foster child adoptions involve older
children72 or trans-racial adoptions73—both scenarios in which
the legal fiction of replicating a biological family is not viable.
69

Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents of American Adoption, 3 THE FUTURE
CHILDREN
17,
21–22
(1993),
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/03_01_01.P
DF.
70
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN ADOPTED FROM
FOSTER CARE: CHILD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, ADOPTION
MOTIVATION,
AND
WELL-BEING
8
(2011),
available
at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/nsap/Brief1/rb.pdf.
71
ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION: HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION
IS TRANSFORMING AMERICA 4–5, 11 (2000).
72
About 20 percent of all foster care adoptions involve children 10 years of
age or older. An additional 31 percent of all foster care adoptions involve
children between 5 and 9. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND
FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT, PRELIMINARY FY
2012 ESTIMATES AS OF NOVEMBER 2013, 5 (2013) [hereinafter AFCARS
2012],
available
at
OF
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This increased openness is not merely a matter of
social changes, but of formal and enforceable legal
agreements. At least 26 states plus the District of Columbia
now by statute recognize post-adoption contact agreements, in
which adoptive and biological parents can enter enforceable
agreements to maintain some form of contact between the
child and biological family.74 This option still requires a
termination of the biological parent-child relationship, though
the contact agreement allows that relationship to functionally
continue through whatever visitation or other contact is
provided.75
Substantively, post-adoption contact agreements
maintain the link between terminations and adoptions; the
biological parent’s rights are terminated (with the exception of
whatever contact rights are agreed to) and that parent ceases to
be a legal parent. But procedurally, post-adoption contact
agreements separate terminations and adoptions. Such
agreements require the involvement of biological parents and
some discussion between them and adoptive parents about the
details of post-adoption contact. Such involvement is difficult
if not impossible if the state has terminated parental rights
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport20.pdf.
73
The federal government has reported that more than one quarter of foster
child adoptions are “transracial, transethnic, or transcultural.” U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 70, at 7. This data is of all
foster child adoptions, including kinship adoptions, which are less likely to
be transracial. The proportion of transracial adoptions among non-kin
foster adoptions are thus likely higher.
74
Sanger, supra note 28, at 319. For an overview of state statutes, see U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH,
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
BIRTH AND ADOPTIVE FAMILIES (May 2011), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/cooperati
ve.pdf. On the enforceability being subject to a child’s best interests, see
id. at 4; D.C. CODE § 4-361(b)(1) (2001).
75
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 32, at 22 (Pt II language explaining PACAs are
still exclusive).
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before the adoptive parents are identified. Earlier terminations
would stop parent-child visits and remove biological parents
from the court case, and make any later post-adoption contact
agreement highly unlikely. Accordingly, the possibility of
such agreements suggests that such early terminations are
appropriate when such agreements would not serve children’s
interests.
California has gone further, enacting a statute in 2013
permitting non-exclusive adoption; if the adoptive and
biological parents agree, then new parents can adopt a child
without terminating the legal relationship between the child
and the biological parents.76 Non-exclusive adoption has the
potential to provide an entirely new permanency option that
obviates the need for terminations of parental rights, and
which may serve important interests of some foster children.77
The availability of multiple options in the adoption
continuum complicates the practice significantly. Traditional
adoption—involving a termination of the biological parentchild legal relationship and the creation of an adoptive parentchild relationship to replace it—left little room for discussion
among the parties. Biological parents could relinquish their
rights or fight a termination trial; there was no middle ground
over which to negotiate. That historical discussion has
dramatically changed, and negotiation between adoptive and
biological families is now inherent in any decision between
traditional closed adoption, adoption with a contact agreement,
and, at least in California, non-exclusive adoption.78
In the child welfare context, such negotiations can
occur along at least two planes. First, in complicated cases in
76

S.B. 274, § 8 (2013) (codified at CALIF. FAM. CODE § 8617), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/postquery?bill_number=sb_274&sess=CUR&house=B&author=leno.
77
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 32.
78
For a discussion of these negotiation dynamics, see Sanger, supra note
28, at 319.
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which there are multiple adoption petitions, biological parents
may seek to shape the outcome by consenting to one petitioner
over another. This may be true even when parents recognize
that their child will be adopted; the likelihood of losing one’s
parental rights does not mean the question of who will obtain
parental rights to their children is not important to biological
parents. These parents may have strong opinions regarding
which prospective adoptive family would be best for their
children, and may also seek adoption by a family that would
provide the most respect for their past role in raising their
children and perhaps even permit the most ongoing contact.
Biological parents might prefer to consent to an adoption
petition by kin over non-kin, for instance, or by a foster parent
they have come to trust over someone they do not know as
well. Second, biological parents might negotiate their consent
in exchange for contact rights. Biological parents have some
modest leverage in that they can insist on a trial over
termination of parental rights if they do not consent to an
adoption; such litigation, like any litigation, can be costly,
time-consuming, stressful, and unpredictable for the parties.
This is not to suggest that such negotiation always
serves children’s interests; as with any negotiation, the parties
must determine whether the zone of possible agreements are
acceptable. In some cases, parents pose such a severe ongoing
physical or emotional threat to children that no ongoing
relationship is appropriate; in such cases, termination and
adoption proceedings are fully appropriate. At the other end of
the spectrum, in some cases, parents have rehabilitated or are
likely to soon rehabilitate and maintain a strong bond with
their children; in such cases motions to restore custody and
legal efforts to fight any efforts towards permanency with a
non-parent remain appropriate. At both extremes, litigation is
preferable to any negotiated adoption with contact.
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Expansion and Establishment of Kinship Care

While the permanency continuum discussed above was
developing, a parallel development changed the makeup of
foster care placements—and thus the permanency options that
would follow.79 Kinship care—foster care provided by
relatives or family-like individuals, rather than by foster
parents previously unknown to children—emerged as a
dramatic force in the 1980s and has grown since.
The percentage of foster children placed with kin
increased from 18 to 31% between 1986 and 1990, and did not
change much since then.80 The timing is important to
understand this growth; foster care rolls expanded in the late
1980s as child protection agencies removed more children in
the wake of the crack-cocaine epidemic. Facing the “limited
capacity of the child welfare system to recruit an adequate
supply of licensable foster homes, particularly in inner city
neighborhoods,” from where disproportionate numbers of
children were removed, these agencies turned to extended
families to provide foster homes.81 This growth in kinship
79

There is, of course, a “strong correlation” between foster home a child
lives in and the permanency plan that is most appropriate for that child.
Cynthia Godsoe, Permanency Puzzle, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1113, 1117
(2013).
80
Testa & Miller, supra note 14, at 410. Although state-by-state data
differences make it impossible to calculate a national average, the best data
suggests that 30 percent of foster children continue to live with kin. U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STATES’ USE OF WAIVERS OF NONSAFETY LICENSING STANDARDS FOR RELATIVE FOSTER FAMILY HOMES 5
(2011) [hereinafter CHILDREN’S BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS],
available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/report_
congress_statesuse.pdf (“For the 32 States that reported percentages based
on all children in foster care, an average of 16 percent of children were
placed in licensed relative foster homes and 14 percent in unlicensed
relative foster homes.”).
81
Testa & Miller, supra note 14, at 410–11.
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placements triggered the policy question of how to achieve
permanency for the growing number of children in kinship
foster care, especially those children who could not reunify
and whose kin did not wish to terminate parental rights. The
result was an increased focus on guardianship as a
permanency option,82 and eventually an increase in children
who left foster care to guardianship or some other permanency
option with kin.83
At the same time, child protection agencies developed
a set of policies and practices designed to facilitate kinship
foster care placements. Many agencies applied flexible
standards to kin seeking foster care licenses, held family group
conferencing meetings and made other efforts early in cases to
help identify kinship placement options—though significant
variation remains between different agencies.84
Even if initially created to meet a pressing need for
foster placements, policies favoring kinship placements are
justified by a body of empirical research showing their value
to children. Social science research establishes that children
often have strong bonds with individuals beyond primary
caretakers. So even if a grandparent or uncle was not the
child’s primary caretaker, child welfare decisions should
respect the bond with those individuals if the child cannot live
with the primary caretaker.85 Strong extended family bonds
are particularly common among the low-income families
overrepresented in foster care because it serves “in part as a
hedge against poverty.”86

82

Id. at 411,
Infra notes125–126and accompanying text.
84
For a discussion of such licensing and meeting efforts in one jurisdiction,
see infra Part III.B. For a discussion of agency variation in kinship
placement policies and practices, see infra Part II.E.1.
85
Patten, supra note 20, at 240-41.
86
Id. at 250.
83
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The strong bonds that precede a placement in kinship
foster care likely lead to many of the well-documented
positive outcomes associated with kinship care. Children in
kinship care are more likely to feel that they belong with the
family they live with than children in non-kinship care.87
Children in kinship care have significantly greater placement
stability—they are less likely to have their initial placement
disrupted, and less likely to experience multiple moves from
one foster home to another.88
Historically, these benefits were balanced by a fear that
kinship foster care would lead to relatively poor permanency
outcomes, and multiple studies found that kinship foster care
correlated with worse adoption outcomes.89 These studies had
two core failings—first, guardianship was not an option for all
families, thus diminishing the permanency outcomes for
kinship families in particular. Second, they failed to control
adequately for differences between children placed in kinship
and non-kinship homes.
A key element in the new permanency is a recognition
that historical fears about kinship care and permanency are
unfounded, and that, if anything, kinship care correlates with
87

Eun Koh & Mark F. Testa, Propensity Score Matching of Children in
Kinship and Nonkinship Foster Care: Do Permanency Outcomes Still
Differ?, 32 Social Work Research 105, 115 (2008).
88
E.g., Eun Koh, Permanency Outcomes of Children in Kinship and Nonkinship Foster Care: Testing the External Validity of Kinship Effects, 32
CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 389, 390 (2010) (collecting studies); id.
at 393 & 396 (reporting findings in his five-state study with matched
samples); Koh & Testa, supra note 87, at 112 (reporting results from study
of matched and unmatched samples). Such stability is evident in both
aggregate numbers and in comparing matched samples of children in
kinship care to children in non-kinship care. Koh & Testa, supra note 87,
at 111–12, 114; see also Marc A. Winokur, et al. Matched Comparison of
Children in Kinship Care and Foster Care on Child Welfare Outcomes, 89
FAMILIES IN SOCIETY 338, 341–42 (2008).
89
Andrew Zinn, Foster Family Characteristics, Kinship, and Permanence,
83 SOC. SCIENCE REV. 185, 189 (2009).
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improved permanency outcomes. Positive results should be
expected because kinship caregivers are highly committed to
taking care of children, as evidenced in the higher rates of
placement stability, and children are more likely to feel that
they belong with kinship caregivers. Recent studies have
identified such results. These studies have tried to rectify
problems with earlier studies, and account for the development
of permanency options other than adoption. Studies that have
rigorously controlled for differences between kinship and nonkinship placements “disconfirm the previous perception that
kinship foster homes are not as effective as non-kinship foster
homes in promoting children’s legal permanence.”90 For
instance, in a review of five states’ data, Eun Koh found three
states in which kinship care led to stronger permanency
outcomes, two states in which it had no statistically significant
effect, and no states in which kinship care had negative
outcomes.91 Another study of Illinois foster care cases found
that children placed in non-kinship foster care were more
likely to exit to adoption or guardianship within the first three
years of foster care, but that kinship foster care led to better
permanency rates over a longer period of time.92 Permanency
law—and, specifically, the creation of the permanency
continuum—has shaped these more positive results. Before
guardianship was available, kinship foster care correlated with
better permanency outcomes, a result that changed when
guardianship became an option.93 That positive statistically
significant results are seen in some states but not others
90

Koh supra note 88, at 395.
Id.
92
Koh & Testa, supra note 87, at 109. Another Illinois study found no
statistical significant between adoption and reunification rates in kinship
and non-kinship foster families. Zinn, supra note 89, at 208–09. Coupled
with the greater likelihood of kin to seek guardianship, the Illinois finding
suggests that kinship placements on the whole positively correlate with
permanency outcomes.
93
Koh & Testa, supra note 87, at 106, 112, 114.
91
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merely reflects that significant variation in policies and
practices continue to exist across states.94
II.

Guardianship’s Continued Subordination95 to
Adoption

Congress offered states federal dollars to support
guardianship subsidies in 2008, taking a big step towards
fiscal equity between adoption and guardianship. After
Fostering Connections, eight states began offering subsidized
guardianships, and more than thirty others began receiving
federal funding to support their existing guardianship
subsidies—giving them the financial ability to expand
guardianship programs. As discussed in Part I, research into
states that began offering subsidized guardianship revealed
that guardianship rates increased, overall permanency rates
increased, and that adoption rates decreased modestly as some
families that would have adopted chose guardianship
instead.96 So, in the six years since Fostering Connections, one
might expect a sizable increase in the number of guardianships
nationally, an improvement in overall permanency outcomes
(the number of adoptions and guardianships combined, or as
compared with children growing up in foster care), or an
increase in the ratio of guardianships to adoptions in the
intervening six years. Indeed, one leading family law scholar
has assumed that Fostering Connections helped cause an
increase in the use of guardianships.97

94

See infra Part III.E (describing variations between states in kinship
placement and guardianship policies and practices).
95
By using the term “subordination,” I echo Eliza Patten’s pre-Fostering
Connections critique of child welfare practice, “The Subordination of
Subsidized Guardianship in Child Welfare Proceedings.” Patten, supra
note 20.
96
Supra Part I.A.1.
97

Clare Huntington, The Limits of Determinacy, 77 L. & Contemp. Probs. 221, 241
(2014).
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Yet national data shows no significant changes—the
adoption hierarchy remains in effect, and the permanency
increases found in states that offered guardianship through
federal waivers before Fostering Connections do not appear to
have been replicated nationally. Guardianships accounted for
7 percent of all exits from foster care in fiscal year 2008, and 7
percent of all exits in fiscal year 2012.98 In the same years, the
percentage of exits from adoptions increased slightly, from 19
percent to 22 percent.99 Overall permanency rates remain
constant; the percentage of foster care exits to “emancipation”
(meaning children have grown up in foster care and never left
to a permanent family) remained steady between 2008 and
2012.100 The percentage of foster children with permanency
98

Compare U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES,
CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2008
ESTIMATES AS OF OCTOBER 2009 4 (2009) (hereinafter AFCARS FY 2008),
and U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2012 ESTIMATES AS OF
NOVEMBER 2013 3 (2013) (hereinafter AFCARS FY 2012). The federal
government also reports exits from foster care to “living with other
relatives,” and this category accounted for 8 percent of all exits in both
years. Id. AFCARS reports for these and intervening years are available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/research-data-technology/statisticsresearch/afcars.
99
AFCARS FY 2008, supra note 98, at 4, AFCARS FY 2012, supra note
98, at 3.
100
AFCARS FY 2008, supra note 98, at 1, AFCARS FY 2012, supra note
98, at 1. During this time period, the absolute numbers of adoptions and
guardianships declined slightly. Adoptions declined from 54,284 in 2008
to 51,225 in 2012, and guardianships from 19,941 to 16,418. AFCARS FY
2008, supra note 98, at 4, AFCARS FY 2012, supra note 98, at 3. This
decrease likely follows from the dramatic decline in the overall foster care
population, from 463,792 in 2008 to 397,122 in 2012. AFCARS 2012,
supra note 72, at 1. That decline results largely from a decrease in the
number of children removed annually from 280,000 in 2008 (and
somewhat higher in the preceding years) to the low 250,000s in the four
years that followed. TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION, supra note
30, at 1. Accordingly, I look at the percentage of exits to each legal status.
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plans of guardianship and adoption also appear unchanged. In
2008, 24 percent of all foster children had a permanency plan
of adoption while 4 percent had a plan of guardianship, and
the federal government reported identical figures for 2012.101
So, despite a big step toward funding equity, the permanency
hierarchy has remained in practice.
There is one recent trend that, on the surface, suggests
an effect from new permanency policies—the number of
terminations has declined and, as the number of adoptions has
remained relatively steady, the number of new legal orphans
has also declined.102 The gap between terminations and
adoptions shrunk from 29,000 in 2008 to 7,000 in 2012.103
One would expect a greater reliance on guardianships to lead
to this result because guardianships do not require
terminations. Yet with neither the number of guardianships
nor the number of guardianship permanency plans increasing,
it is hard to discern how new permanency policies caused the
decrease in terminations. A different, or at least more
complicated, set of causes likely exists.
It is important to note two limitations on these
statistics. First, these are national statistics that do not tell an
accurate story for every jurisdiction; Part III will analyze one
jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, in which guardianships
have become more frequent since Fostering Connections.
Second, it is possible that a more rigorous evaluation of post2008 data could discern some subtle effect of Fostering
Connections.

101

AFCARS FY 2008, supra note 98, at 1, AFCARS FY 2012, supra note
98, at 1.The permanency plan of “live with other relatives” was similarly
unchanged—it was 4 percent in 208 and 3 percent in 2012.
102
See TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION, supra note 30 (reporting
total numbers of terminations and adoptions of foster children for the
previous decade).
103
Id.
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Why, then, has the Fostering Connections Act failed to
achieve the results that research into guardianship would
suggest? One factor may be financial; Fostering Connections
was enacted in fall 2008, just as the great recession imposed
tremendous fiscal pressures on state budgets. Many states may
have used the infusion of federal funds to shore up other child
welfare services rather than expand guardianship. But those
same states are able to see the fiscal benefits of a robust
guardianship program—if permanency outcomes are
improved, and the federal government contributes to
guardianship subsidies, then states will save significant costs
on foster care with a guardianship expansion. So more
complicated factors than the great recession are at work.
Fostering Connections’ failure (so far) to change
permanency outcomes has a complex set of causes. The first is
legal—the law maintains a hierarchy of permanency options
with adoption above guardianship. The second is cultural—the
various forces within family court systems that reinforce
adoption’s primacy, and guardianship’s subordination, despite
funding provided through Fostering Connections and research
demonstrating its benefits to children. The third is the
concentration within child welfare agencies of immense
discretion regarding some of the most relevant decisions.
These agencies determine, as a matter of policy, how flexible
their kinship licensing and placement standards are, whether to
take federal dollars for guardianship subsidies and, if so,
whether and what restrictions to place on guardianships. In
individual cases, agency caseworkers have immense discretion
whether to place children with kin, and whether to offer
guardianship as an option to foster families—or even disclose
that guardianship is an option. Agencies—as a matter of both
policy and case worker practice—have largely104 chosen a

104

This statement is a generalization about agencies nationally. Certain
exceptions apply, and one is explored in depth in Part III.
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course of action that continues to subordinate guardianship
and elevate adoption.
A.

Legal Structure Creates a Hierarchy

Fostering Connections provides federal funding for
guardianships, but conditions that funding on states following
a permanency hierarchy that subordinates guardianship.
Eligibility for federal dollars requires states to rule out
adoption before considering guardianship.105 Fostering
Connections thus leaves in place adoption’s primary role—and
guardianship’s secondary role—when reunification will not
occur; and also leaves intact child welfare law’s historic focus
on terminations of parental rights and adoptions as the default
option when a child cannot reunify with parents.
This structure dates back to the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980,106 a statute that requires states
to follow a list of requirements in exchange for federal child
welfare funding.107 This federal funding law provides most of
the core requirements of modern child welfare practice. When
105

The legislative history does not state why Congress made this policy
choice. It likely resulted from coalition politics among those advocating for
the bill. The Congressional Record includes a long list of advocacy
organizations which endorsed the bill, some of which are explicitly
adoption focused—such as the Adopt America Network, the American
Academy of Adoption Attorneys, and Children Awaiting Parents, to list
several with adoption-focused names. 154 CONG. REC. H8304-01 (17 Sept.
2008) (listing signatories to a letter of support for the bill). Many of these
coalition members likely subscribed to the adoption ideology discussed in
Part II.B, thus making any legislative steps to attack adoption’s primacy
politically difficult.
106
Legal articles soon after the 1980 legislation reflected this view. For
instance, Marcia Robinson Lowry decried leaving children who could not
reunify with parents in foster care for too long, and framed the problem as
how to get such children adopted—not how to choose the best permanency
option for them. Marcia Robinson Lowry, Legal Strategies to Facilitate
Adoption of Children in Foster Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS
264 (Mark Hardin ed. 1983).
107
Pub. L. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980).
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children remain in foster care for a certain amount of time,
state family courts must hold hearings to determine if
reunification is likely and, if not, how the child might achieve
permanency. The 1980 legislation required states to hold a
“dispositional hearing” for all foster children who did not
reunify quickly, with the purpose of “determin[ing] the future
status of the child,” defined as whether “the child should be
return[ed] to the parent,” “should be placed for adoption,” or
should remain in foster care.108 Although the 1980 law
recognized guardianship,109 it framed permanency decisions as
binary—reunification or adoption—and that binary has shaped
child welfare practice ever since.110 This hierarchy reflected
the emergence in the 1970s of the “permanency planning”
movement, which focused on reunification or adoption.
Despite some academics urging inclusion of guardianship, and
its inclusion in at least one state’s federally funded child
welfare demonstration, guardianship was nowhere near the
center of the debate.111 And Congress placed its money
accordingly. As its title suggests, the 1980 Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act provided federal funds to
reimburse states for subsidies paid to adoptive parents,112
while Congress established no such funding for guardianships.
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997113
(ASFA) reinforced the primacy of adoption and termination of
parental rights when children cannot reunify. First, ASFA
required states to file termination of parental rights cases and
108

Pub. L. 96-272, § 101 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1982)).
Supra note 1515. See also Pub. L. 96-272, § 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 627(a)(1) & (a)(2)(C) (1982)) (appropriating funding for state child
welfare agencies to provide services to “facilitate” reunification “or the
placement of the child for adoption or legal guardianship”).
110
See Huntington, supra note 57, at 87 (“In the child-welfare system, a
parent must regain custody of the children or face termination of parental
rights”).
111
Testa & Miller, supra note 14, at 406–07.
112
Pub. L. 96-272, § 101 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 673 (1982)).
113
Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
109
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recruit adoptive families whenever children have been in
foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months.114 ASFA
created an exception for when states had placed foster children
in homes with a relative115—implying that guardianship was
only appropriate for relatives.116 And nothing in ASFA (or in
the pre-existing federal law) provided any preference for
kinship placements generally, so there was no push to place
children with relatives in the first instance. If child welfare
agencies placed children with non-kinship foster homes, then
the termination of parental rights exception would not apply—
even if viable kinship placements existed. Second, ASFA
expanded adoption subsidies, creating new adoption incentive
payments that would flow directly to state governments that
increased the number of foster child adoptions.117 ASFA
continued to provide no funds for guardianship subsidies.118
Still, ASFA did solidify guardianship’s place as a permanency
option, listing it as a possible “permanency plan” that courts
could set,119 and defining guardianship to mean any legal
status that grants physical and legal custody to an adult, other
than a parent, “which is intended to be permanent.”120
Policymakers expected that ASFA’s push for speedier
permanency hearings and termination cases would lead to
more adoptions; foster children would be “freed” for adoption,
and child welfare agencies could “tap into the presumably
114

Pub. L. 105-89, § 103(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000)).
Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i) (2000)).
116
Other exceptions exist, but are used rarely – if the state determines
some “compelling reason” exist to not terminate parental rights, or if the
state acknowledges that it has not made reasonable efforts to facilitate
reunification. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i)&(ii) (2000).
117
Pub. L. 105-89, § 201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 673b (2000)).
118
ASFA was enacted in 1997, before studies demonstrated guardianship
was as lasting as adoption. The prevailing view of the federal government
was that guardianship was less permanent than and thus inferior to
adoption. Supra note 39 and accompanying text.
119
Pub. L. 105-89, § 302 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 475(5)(C) (2000)).
120
Pub. L. 105-89, § 101(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(7) (2000)).
115
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large pool of middle-class families who were able and willing
to adopt minority children from foster care but were
previously discouraged from doing so.”121 A law enacted in
1994, the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, would facilitate
transracial adoptions.122
The results, however, revealed a far more complicated
story. The number of foster child adoptions increased from
about 36,000 in 1998 to about 53,000 in 2002,123 and have
remained roughly level since then.124 Certainly some of this
increase resulted from faster terminations and more adoptions
by foster parents. But a large proportion of this increase—
accounting for about 7,000 of the 17,000 increase—was from
more kinship adoptions.125 And even greater permanency
improvements came from a near doubling of foster child
guardianships in the same period, and an increase in other
discharges from foster care to kinship placement (many of
which involve custody or other analogs to guardianship).126
Fostering Connections did recognize this growth in
guardianships and provided federal funding for kinship
guardianship subsidies for states that chose to provide such
subsidies. Providing federal funds for the first time rectified a
tremendous imbalance in federal funding for various
permanency options.
121

Testa, New Permanency Strategies, supra note 4, at 116.
Id. Pub. L. 103-382, §§ 551-555 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18)).
123
Testa, New Permanency Strategies, supra note 4, at 116.
124
Between fiscal year 2003 and 2012, total numbers of foster child
adoptions fluctuated between 49,629 and 57,185. Most recently, in FY
2012, there were 52,039. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND
FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ADOPTIONS OF CHILDREN WITH PUBLIC
CHILD WELFARE AGENCY INVOLVEMENT BY STATE FY 2003-FY2012, 3
(2013),
available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/children_adopted.pdf.
125
Testa, New Permanency Strategies, supra note 4, at 116.
126
Id.
122
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Congress nonetheless left intact adoption’s primacy
over guardianship. First and foremost, Congress established an
explicit hierarchy of permanency options with adoption above
guardianship. To obtain federal dollars for guardianship
subsidies, states had to first rule out adoption as a permanency
plan.127 The federal government had included this rule-out
requirement as a condition of waivers granted to several states
that had, prior to 2008, used federal funds to support
guardianship experiments.128 Congress did not say how states
had to rule out adoption—leaving state agencies with
discretion over how to do so. As we will see in Part II.E, many
agencies and caseworkers have used that discretion to decline
to even present guardianship as an option to kin. Similarly,
Congress included no language requiring states to provide
comparable guardianship and adoption subsidies—allowing
states to continue incentivizing adoptions more than
guardianships, as some states have done.129 Third, Congress
renewed and expanded federal financial support for adoption
subsidies, without enacting parallel guardianship provisions.130
Fourth, Congress limited federally supported guardianship
subsidies to kinship guardianships, explicitly excluding nonkinship guardianships.131 These continuing hierarchies
reflected the views of some adoption advocates, who endorsed
subsidized guardianship only if Congress maintained its
subordinate status to adoption.132

127

42 U.S.C. § 673(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2011). Congress also required states to
document how they ruled out adoption. Id. at § 675(1)(F)(i) (2011).
128
Mark F. Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 34, at 500–01.
129
Infra note200 and accompanying text.
130
Pub. L. 110-351, §§ 401-403.
131
Pub. L. 110-351, § 101(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 673(d)(1)(A) &
(d)(3)(A)).
132
E.g., National Council for Adoption, Adoption Advocate No. 5:
Guardian Adoption While Subsidizing Guardianship (2008), available at
https://www.adoptioncouncil.org/publications/2007/09/adoption-advocateno-5. .
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The titles of the major federal financing statutes
illustrate the modest step taken in 2008. The Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997, as their names suggest, place
adoption atop the permanency hierarchy. The full name of the
2008 legislation—the Fostering Connections to Success and
Increasing Adoptions Act—slightly deemphasizes adoption,
but makes clear that adoption, and not guardianship or broader
“permanency” remains federal law’s preferred goal.
B.

A “Binding” Ideology

A subtle ideological shift in judges’ and agencies’
understanding of permanency also contributes to adoption’s
continued primacy. Leading up to ASFA’s passage, the federal
government convened a work group to issue “Guidelines for
Public Policy and State Legislation Governing Permanency for
Children.” The resulting guidelines, issued in 1999, defined
permanency as a physical and legal arrangement that gives
children a good home in which to grow up, lasting
relationships with nurturing caregivers, and “stability and
continuity of caregivers” in a home “that is legally secure.”133
The next year, the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges published their own “Adoption and Permanency
Guidelines,” and made an important change. Stable caregivers
and a “legally secure” home were not enough; rather,
permanency, according to the Council, requires a “legal
relationship that is binding on the adults awarded care,
custody and control of the child.”134 The Guidelines continue
133

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, ADOPTION 2002: THE PRESIDENT’S INITIATIVE ON ADOPTION AND
FOSTER CARE: GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND STATE LEGISLATION
GOVERNING PERMANENCE FOR CHILDREN I-3 (1999).
134
NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, ADOPTION
AND PERMANENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 14 (2000) (emphasis added).
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by recommending that judges ask a series of questions before
approving a permanency plan of guardianship; these questions
differ from those recommended before approving a plan of
adoption, and underscore the concern about a less binding
legal status. The questions include “What is the plan to ensure
that this will be a permanent home for the child?” even though
the empirical research reflect that guardianship is just as
permanent as adoption.135
The emphasis on a binding commitment required a
preference for adoption, because adoption is more legally
binding than guardianship. Adoptions can only be terminated
in the same narrow circumstances in which biological parentchild relationships can be terminated, while guardianships are
subject to modifications or terminations upon motion by any
party. This difference is easily exaggerated. First,
guardianship modifications still require proof of some
significant changed circumstance and that modifying the
guardianships would serve children’s best interests.136 Second,
adoption’s more legally binding nature has not made it more
lasting or permanent in fact, as the guardianship studies
discussed in Part I.A establish. Nonetheless, the push for the
more binding commitment—regardless of whether there is
reason to think this difference affects actual outcomes for
children—has defined the debate about the permanency
hierarchy for years.137
The emphasis on legally binding commitments has
never been fully justified, especially in light of the strong
empirical record establishing that guardianship creates real ties
that bind child and caregiver just as long and just as
effectively as adoption. The Council’s Guidelines offer no
clear explanation for the “binding” emphasis. Later documents
135

Id. at 21.
E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2395(d) (2001).
137
Testa aptly titled one article on the topic “The Quality of Permanence—
Lasting or Binding?” Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 34.
136
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from the Council repeat the “binding” definition, but without
any clear ideology.138 And it remains controversial, with many
legal and mental health commentators defining permanency by
children’s “feelings of belongingness” in an “enduring
relationship” rather than legal status.139
The continued insistence on “binding” commitments
diminishes the effect of Congress’s 2008 decision to make
federal funding available for guardianship subsidies. Even
with policies that come closer to funding parity for the two
permanency options, differences in how binding they are
remain, allowing many courts and agencies to continue
preferring adoption, and acting accordingly in individual
cases.
C.

Adoption’s Ideological and Cultural Primacy

Adoption’s primacy over guardianship is endemic
through family court culture. Family courts nationwide
celebrate “Adoption Day” every fall.140 The day is specifically
“adoption day”—not “guardianship day” or “permanency

138

NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FOREVER
FAMILIES: IMPROVING OUTCOMES BY ACHIEVING PERMANENCY FOR
LEGAL ORPHANS 18 (2013). This is the most detailed publication from the
Council since Fostering Connections. It acknowledges that guardianship
might be appropriate for some legal orphans (provided, of course, adoption
is ruled out first), and that extended foster care for children whose parentchild relationships have been terminated by the state leads to poor
outcomes. Id. at 4–5. Yet the publication maintains a grudging attitude
towards guardianship, suggesting that it is only appropriate when adoption
is ruled out and “if [guardianship] has the characters of legal permanency,”
including a “binding” nature. Id. at 17–18. The Council does not clarify
what would make one guardianship binding but another not, or why
extended foster care would be better than permanency through
guardianship.
139
Godsoe, supra note 79, at 1114 & n.4.
140
See NATIONAL ADOPTION DAY, http://www.nationaladoptionday.org/
(last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
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day”—underscoring adoption’s primacy in public view.141
Judges and court officials publicly describe the value and
importance of adoption, and finalize foster care adoptions in
front of a pool of local press and politicians.142 Gauzy media
coverage follows.143 This coverage presents adoption as
providing a positive “forever home” for earnest and appealing
children, and certainly better than the temporary status of
foster care.144 Biological families—and any remaining
connections or visitation rights these children may have with
them—are not discussed.145 The public image of permanency
is thus presented simplistically—a good family provides a
good home to a good child and, implicitly, a bad family and
the bad foster care system is left behind.146 And it is presented
141

Notably, efforts have begun to balance adoption day with “National
Reunification Month,” to celebrate the many families separated by foster
care who subsequently reunify. National Reunification Month, AMERICAN
BAR
ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/child_law/what_we_do/projects/nrd.ht
ml. No such efforts have been made, however, to balance adoption day
with other forms of permanency.
142
E.g., Kathryn Alfisi and Thai Phi Le, New Families Created at Annual
Adoption
Day
Event,
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
COURTS,
http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/2013-01-01_New-FamiliesCreated-at-Annual-Adoption-Day-Event.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014)
(describing the District of Columbia’s 2013 Adoption Day, and noting
remarks by presiding judges and the mayor).
143
For a selection of such coverage, see DC Adoption Day in the News,
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
COURTS,
http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/media/adoptionday/main.jsf (last visited
Oct. 25, 2014).
144
E.g., WNEW, Adoption Day Celebrated at D.C. Courthouse, DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
COURTS
(Nov.
23,
2013),
http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/Adoption-Day-2013WNEW.pdf; Luz Lazo, Adoptions Finalized During Annual Adoption Day
Celebration in the District, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2013),
http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/Adoptions-finalized-duringannual-Adoption-Day-celebration-in-the-District-Post.pdf.
145
See sources cited supra note 144.
146
See Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption
Tide: Making the Case for “Impermanence,” 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 410
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in such a way that excludes the core reason that guardianships
and open adoptions have become prominent—the ongoing
connections that many foster children have with biological
families.
This simplistic image goes deeper than the media, and
likely explains why many agencies and caseworkers do not
even inform many families about the possibility of
guardianship,147 a phenomenon that helps explain why the
2008 Fostering Connections Act has not led to increases in the
number of guardianships nationally.148 Cynthia Godsoe
concludes that many system actors harbor deep-seated biases
in favor of simpler “stock stories” about good adoptive
families taking the place of bad biological families.149 Many
case workers (not to mention lawyers and judges) continue to
see guardianship “as a narrow exception for a select group of
families who do not fit into the preferred categories of
biological or adoptive families.”150 The strength of this stock
story leads many to disbelieve the data establishing that
guardianship is just as good for children as adoption.151
This stock story’s continued hierarchy of adoption over
guardianship is reinforced in multiple ways throughout the
child welfare profession. Federal agencies charged with
reporting national child welfare statistics emphasize adoptions
over guardianship. The federal Children’s Bureau—a subdivision of the Department of Health and Human Services—
(2005) (“[C]hild welfare policy . . . continues to laud adoption as the
singularly ideal ‘happy ending’ in the sad tale of foster care.”); Marsha
Garrison, Parents’ Rights vs. Children’s Interest: The Case of the Foster
Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 386–87 (1996) (describing
adoption’s emotional appeal).
147
Infra Part II.B.
148
Supra notes98-101 and accompanying text.
149
Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113,
146–48 (2012), http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/13717-lcb171art3godsoepdf.
150
Id. at 146.
151
Id. at 147.
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publishes detailed annual data on the number of adoptions of
foster children and the number of children waiting to be
adopted, including their numbers, their types of placements,
their race, their age, and their length in care.152 The Children’s
Bureau also reports the total number of guardianships of foster
children,153 but provides nowhere close to the statistical detail
provided for adoptions. Other federal data reports display
decade-long trends of the number of children who entered
foster care, exited foster care, were subject to termination of
parental rights orders, and were adopted—omitting
guardianships or any other permanency outcome besides
adoption.154 These data gaps partly result from congressional
directives to report “comprehensive national information”
regarding foster care and adoption, but not guardianship155
(something Fostering Connections did nothing to change).
Still, the Children’s Bureau has not used its regulatory
authority to require states to provide additional data, and has
only issued regulations to require detailed adoption-related
data.156
Law schools also reinforce adoption’s primacy and
guardianship’s subordination. As awkward as the existing law
is—in which guardianship exists as a less preferred option to
adoption—law school casebooks suggest an even worse reality
in which guardianship is not permanency or, worse yet, does
not even exist. One leading casebook (updated in 2014, six
years after Fostering Connections) makes clear that
permanency planning and termination of parental rights are
152

AFCARS 2012, supra note 72, at 4–6.
Id. at 3.
154
TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION, supra note 30.
155
42 U.S.C. § 679(c)(3).
156
45 C.F.R. § Pt. 1355, App. B, Adoption Data Elements. No similar
regulations exist for guardianship. The statute provides that “Each State
shall submit statistical reports as the Secretary may require,” thus
authorizing the Children’s Bureau to require far more data than currently
collected. 42 U.S.C. § 676(b).
153
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linked,157 but does not discuss guardianship in reference to
permanency planning. Rather, the casebook discusses
guardianship as a “type[] of placement” within foster care—
misleadingly suggesting that guardianship is not a form of
permanency or of leaving foster care.158 It also suggests that
guardianship is for kinship placements only, despite its
availability for non-kin.159 This casebook compares favorably
to other casebooks; one discusses permanency planning,
terminations of parental rights, and adoptions, without
reference to guardianship.160 Yet another devotes long
chapters to terminations and adoptions, without a single
reference to guardianship.161 While emphasizing termination
of parental rights cases may be understandable, excluding
guardianship presents a misleading view of the law.
D.

Procedural Differences Reinforce the Hierarchy

As a corollary to adoption’s present place at the top of
the permanency hierarchy, adoption triggers the most stringent
procedural protections afforded in child welfare. Terminations
of parental rights—a prerequisite to an adoption—must be
157

DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, ET AL., CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE,
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 455 (5th ed. 2014).
158
Id. at 522–31. Chapter 5, Section 6 discusses “Types of Placements,”
including foster care placements of foster parents, institutional care, and
independent living, alongside guardianship.
159
The casebook introduces guardianship as appealing to a “kinship foster
parent” and that for such children for whom adoption is not feasible, the
best option may be guardianship “by a relative.” Id. at 522. No mention is
made of non-kinship guardianship.
160
LESLIE J. HARRIS, ET AL., CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE LAW: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS
688–728 (3d ed. 2012).
161
SAMUEL M. DAVIS, ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES
AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2009). This casebook devotes a full chapter to
terminations, id. at 742–89, and to adoptions, id. at 790–848, and notes that
foster parents sometimes seek an adoptive placement preference. Id. at 734.
But the casebook contains nary a mention of guardianship; the term does
not even appear in the index. Id. at 1231.
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proven by clear and convincing evidence.162 The U.S.
Supreme Court has described terminations and adoptions as “a
unique kind of deprivation”163 because they are so permanent,
and the importance of parental rights so great.164 States
typically have detailed termination and adoption statutory
schemes to require proof of ongoing parental unfitness that is
unlikely to be remedied, and that the termination is in the
child’s best interests.165
In contrast, guardianships do not trigger as many
procedural protections, which courts have justified by
emphasizing their allegedly temporary nature. States vary in
the substance of what must be proven, with many establishing
less rigorous standards than exist for terminations and
adoptions.166 Many states have set a lower standard of proof in
guardianship cases, requiring only proof by a preponderance
of the evidence.167 Courts have approved this lower standard
of proof on the theory that guardianship “terminat[es] only
some of a parent’s rights to his or her child,” and, unlike
terminations, can be modified at a later time.168 Tellingly, one
court asserted that the statute creating “permanent
guardianship” contained a “lack of permanency”—that is, the
allegedly temporary nature of guardianship as compared with

162

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
164
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59.
165
E.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 211.447.5&.7 (West 2014).
166
See Katz, supra note 41, at 1098–1102 (surveying state statutes and
finding only four guardianship statutes that equate guardianship standards
with termination standards).
167
E.g., L.L. v. Colorado, 10 P.3d 1271 (Colo. en banc 2000); D.C. CODE
§ 16-2388(f) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE. § 13.36.040(b) (2010). Other
states have set higher standards of proof. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 44-10-3(f)
(2013). See Katz, supra note 41, at 1097–98 (collecting state statutes).
168
In re A.G., 900 A.2d 677, 680–82 (2006).
163

06 GUPTA_MACRO FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

56

UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy

3/11/2015 12:55 PM

Vol. 19:1

termination of parental rights and adoption justified fewer
procedural protections.169
These reduced procedural protections can make
guardianship appear attractive. Guardianship promises a
“simpler” judicial process,170 or a way to achieve permanency
if the state cannot meet its burden to terminate.171 These
attractions, however, are difficult to justify in light of data
showing that guardianships are just as permanent as adoptions;
that similarity calls for similar protections.172 Moreover, the
lower procedural protections underscore guardianship’s
continued subordination, and may do more to discourage
agencies from pursuing guardianships and courts from
approving permanency plans of guardianship.
Finally, guardianship cases are often not even heard in
family courts. Many states use guardianship provisions of their
probate code to adjudicate foster care guardianship cases, thus
excluding guardianships from some unified family courts, and
providing a far less detailed statutory structure than exists for
terminations.173 This procedural issue can create real-life
169

Id. at 681.
Testa & Miller, supra note 14, at 415.
171
Supra note 66 and accompanying text.
172
Infra Part IV.B.
173
Hardin, supra note 4, at 182–83. For example, Missouri guardianship
cases are handled through its probate code, MO. REV. STAT. § 475.030
(West 2012), not its juvenile code. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.011 et seq. (West
2012). Family court jurisdiction does not include probate actions. MO.
REV. STAT. § 487.080 (West 2012). In such states, guardianship cases must
be heard in the probate court, or at least referred from the probate court for
consolidation with a family court case—a process which takes time and
unnecessarily delays permanency. Other states assign guardianship cases to
family courts, but direct those courts to apply probate court procedures.
New York is an example. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 661(c) & (a) (McKinney
2011). Probate court standards are less rigorous than termination of
parental rights statutes. Compare N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT §§ 1706-1707
(McKinney 2011) and N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 614, 622, 623 & 625
(McKinney 2011). Exceptions to this statement apply in states with statutes
specifically governing guardianship of foster children. E.g., D.C. CODE
170
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obstacles to using guardianships, displaying terminations and
adoptions—which typically fall in the family court’s
jurisdiction—as the paths of less jurisdictional resistance.174
At the very least, using a statute designed for a different
purpose—assigning guardianship of orphans—and assigning
cases to the probate court communicates guardianship’s
continued lesser status.
E.

Child Welfare Agencies Hold Tremendous Authority at
Key Junctures, with Only Weak Court Oversight

Child welfare agencies and their individual case
workers hold tremendous discretion to shape the key
permanency decisions. Despite complex judicial procedures,
including regular permanency hearings, two core decisions are
effectively granted to agencies in the first instance. Agencies
determine where the child lives—and, especially, whether the
child should live with kin or not—and in many jurisdictions
they determine whether options other than adoption are even
presented to families.
1.
Child Welfare Agency
Power over Whether to Make a
Kinship Foster Home Placement
The available methods for placing foster children with
kin focus authority on child welfare agencies. When family
members seek to be a placement, child welfare law gives
agencies discretion to determine whether to issue a foster care
license—and, often, whether to waive licensing standards that
require a minimum amount of square footage in a home or
disfavor certain past criminal convictions. The federal
government has summarized state statutes as generally
§ 16-2381 et seq. (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. 3b:12a-1 et seq. (2002). Probate
code provisions tend to be far sparser in terms of the substantive findings
required and procedures to be followed. Compare, e.g., MO. REV. STAT.
§ 475.030 (West 2012) and § 211.447 (West 2012).
174
Hardin, supra note 4, at 183.
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providing some form of preference for kinship placements, but
focusing such preferences on agencies rather than courts.
Agencies are required to determine that prospective kinship
caregivers are “fit and willing,” granting agencies significant
discretion in determining whether to place children with
kin.175 And agencies retain the authority to determine where a
child is placed; federal funding law requires that the state
agency, and not the court, have “placement and
care . . . responsibility,”176 and federal regulations even ban
federal reimbursements “when a court orders a placement with
a specific foster care provider.”177 Agency guidance has
suggested some flexibility in applying this regulation,178 but
the statute and regulation are worded clearly enough to send a
strong caution to courts seeking to order a specific kinship
placement over an agency objection.
The weakness of laws regarding kinship foster care is
evident in comparing federal child welfare law with the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which governs child welfare cases
175

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN
YOUTH AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S
BUREAU, PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN WITH RELATIVES 2-3 (2013)
[hereinafter PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN WITH RELATIVES], available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/placemen
t.cfm (last visited May 27, 2014).
176
42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(B) (2010).
177
45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(3) (2012).
178
The federal government has suggested that so long as a court “hears the
relevant testimony and works with all parties, including the agency with
placement and care responsibility, to make appropriate placement
decisions, we will not disallow the payments.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE POLICY
MANUAL,
§ 8.3A.12
(June
23,
2003),
available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/cwpm/programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm/poli
cy_dsp.jsp?citID=31. It is not clear what it means for a court ordering a
placement over an agency’s objection to “work[] with” that agency. Nor is
it clear how this policy guidance can trump the plain language of the
regulation.

06 GUPTA_MACRO FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2015

The New Permanency

3/11/2015 12:55 PM

59

involving Indian children. ICWA creates a preference absent
“good cause to the contrary” for foster care, pre-adoptive, and
adoptive placements with any member of the child’s extended
family.179 None of the various kinship placement provisions
applicable in non-ICWA cases creates such a clear legal
preference for kinship placements. At most, federal financing
law requires states to “consider” giving priority to kinship
placements.180 Rather than require anything more than
consideration, child welfare law instead concentrates power in
child welfare agencies that have discretion to make a kinship
placement if they so choose, but no obligation to use that
discretion or justify a decision to not do so.
As a result, significant variation exists when it comes
to licensing kinship foster homes and placing children in such
homes.181 Even six years after Congress granted states greater
flexibility to license kinship foster homes, state agencies have
reported unfamiliarity with their authority.182 Even among
states that understand their flexibility apply it quite
179

25 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) (adoptive placement preference) & 1915(b)(i)
(foster and preadoptive placement preference). ICWA also includes a
preference for a non-kinship Indian foster home over a non-kinship nonIndian foster home. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(ii)-(iii). My focus is only on the
kinship placement preference, and not on those broader tribal preferences.
ICWA, enacted in 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, (Nov. 8, 1978), does not include
language regarding guardianship, but applying a preference for kinship
guardianship would be consistent with its other kinship preference
provisions. At least one state requires that a judge (not an agency) place a
child with kin unless the judge finds such a placement contrary to the
child’s welfare. LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art. 683(B). That statute is the
exception that proves the rule for reasons discussed throughout this
subsection.
180
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) (2010).
181
The variation between states is a starting point of social science
research into kinship care. E.g., WINOKUR, ET AL., supra note 88, at 339
(“[A] great disparity still exists in state policies and practices regarding the
assessment, selection, certification, and monitoring of kin caregivers.”).
182
Making It Work, supra note 11, at 19. See also Koh, supra note 88, at
195–96.
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differently—some states might waive certain licensing
requirements that others would not. The federal government
reported that in 2009, 15 states prohibited licensing waivers
entirely and 11 states lacked “the infrastructure” to report
accurate numbers of licensing waivers—suggesting the
absence of consistently applied policies in those states. Of the
remaining states, the number of waivers granted over a year
varied from 1 to 274.183
In addition to these policy variations, significant
differences exist in the actual number of children that agencies
place with kin in each state. In 2009, for instance, the
percentage of foster children who states place with kin varied
from a low of 2 percent in Alabama to 46 percent in Hawaii.184
Many states also choose to place children with kin but without
granting the kin a foster care license.185 The percentage of
foster children placed in such unlicensed homes ranged from 0
in several states to 33 percent in Iowa.186 The decision in
many states to use unlicensed kinship care limits permanency
options. If children are to be eligible for federally reimbursed
guardianship subsidies, Fostering Connections requires them
to live in homes receiving foster care maintenance
payments,187 which in turn requires placement in a licensed
“foster family home.”188 States that elect to place children in
unlicensed kinship homes, thus, effectively choose to exclude
183

CHILDREN’S BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 80, at 5.
Id. at 6–7.
185
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN WITH RELATIVES, supra note 174, at 3.
186
Id. Several states did not report the number children in kinship
placements as a percentage of total placements, and instead reported “the
percentages of children in licensed and unlicensed relative care as a
proportion of children in relative care only.” Id. at 6 n.2. Significant
variation exists among these states as well—the ratio of licensed to
unlicensed kinship care ranged from a high of 87:13 in Idaho to 4:96 in
Florida.
187
42 U.S.C. § 673(d)(3)(A)(i)(II) (2011).
188
42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(C) (2010). The federal statute defines “foster
family home” as a licensed foster home. 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (2010).
184
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those families from the benefits offered by Fostering
Connections.
Courts generally lack authority to order an agency to
issue a foster care license; issuing a license is an
administrative decision, and federal law requires state
agencies, not courts, have “placement . . . responsibility.”189
Family courts do have authority to determine if agencies make
“reasonable efforts” to achieve the permanency plan that a
court has set,190 and federal funding depends on positive court
findings.191 But there are no court findings regarding the
reasonableness of efforts to identify and place a child with kin,
or regarding the reasonableness of an agency decision to not
place a child with kin. Agencies may unreasonably fail to
place a child with kin upon removal and then, at a permanency
hearing one year later, rely on bonds formed with the nonkinship foster family to argue that the child’s permanency plan
should be adoption with that family, rather than permanency
with the kin. Courts lack power to directly check agencies’
placement errors. Some courts can order specific placements
in an unlicensed kinship home, but use such power
sparingly.192 Without a foster care license, such placements
will not be eligible for federally supported subsidies.
The placement decision is of immense importance.
Decisions early in the case—such as whether to place a child
with kinship caregivers or with strangers immediately upon
removal—can shape later permanency outcomes.193 Agencies
189

42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(B) (2010).
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)-(C) (2010).
191
45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (2012).
192
E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2320(a)(3)(C) (2001). The District’s foster care
agency reports very few children placed through this statute—only 2 of
809 children who entered foster care in FY 2010, the last year in which the
agency reported this data. 2010 D.C. GOV’T CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS.
AGENCY ANN. PUB. REP. at 23 (2011) [hereinafter . CFSA, 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT].
193
Hardin, supra note 4, at 156.
190
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and judges will typically apply a preference for permanency
with whomever the child has been living throughout foster
care.194 Even most non-kinship adoptive parents began as
foster parents; less than one-quarter of non-kinship adoptive
parents were recruited to adopt without having first served as a
foster parent.195 The key decisions in many cases are to place
particular children in particular foster homes rather than in
others (or rather than in kinship homes); whoever the foster
parent is will be the most likely candidate for permanency if
reunification fails.
An agency decision to deny a potential kinship
placement could also undermine permanency later, especially
when no other adult is willing to become an adoptive parent or
guardian for the child.196 Knowing that kinship placements are
significantly more stable than other placements,197 the child
will be at relatively high risk of placement disruptions, and,
thus, may not be a strong candidate for a permanent caregiver
if that becomes necessary. And the agency will have already
rejected a kinship candidate. The agency will then be faced
with a particularly difficult task—recruiting a permanent
caregiver for a foster child who may bear the scars both of
underlying maltreatment and of an unstable time in foster care.
This task, while possible to achieve, is far harder than
achieving permanency for a child placed appropriately in the
first instance.
194

When reunification is not possible, the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges has adopted a preference for “adoption by the relative
or foster family with whom the child is living.” NAT’L COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, ADOPTION AND PERMANENCY
GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES 14 (2000).
195
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN ADOPTED FROM
FOSTER CARE: CHILD AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, ADOPTION
MOTIVATION,
AND
WELL-BEING
6–7
(2011),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/nsap/Brief1/rb.pdf.
196
Making It Work, supra note 11, at 13.
197
Supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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2.
Child Welfare Agency
Discretion over Whether to
Offer Guardianship
Once it is time to discuss permanency options with a
foster parent (kinship or not), agencies and caseworkers then
have discretion to push families towards one permanency
option over another, typically adoption over guardianship, and
even to conceal the availability of guardianship from some
families. Here too, significant variation exists from one
agency to another and even from one caseworker to another—
with the result that children and caregivers lack uniform
access to guardianship as a permanency option. This was true
before Fostering Connections,198 and remains true today.
States differ in how difficult they make it to rule out adoption
before considering guardianship, whether children of all ages
are eligible for guardianship, and whether foster parents are
eligible for guardianship subsidies.199 States differ in the
subsidies offered to guardians; some offer the same subsidies
to adoptive parents and to guardians while others offer
significantly more to adoptive parents, creating a financial
incentive for foster parents to choose adoption over
guardianship.200
When child protection agencies have the authority to
determine whether to offer and implement certain permanency
options, the assignment of caseworkers to particular
families—and their individual beliefs about permanency—can
be outcome determinative. Individual case worker opinions
vary significantly, and many states report that case workers
can even determine whether to make a foster family aware of
the full continuum of permanency options.201 When state
198

Patten, supra note 20, at 260.
Making It Work, supra note 11, at 13–15; Synthesis of Findings, supra
note 25, at 4, 21–22.
200
Godsoe, supra note 148, at 145.
201
Synthesis of Findings, supra note 25, at 22–23.
199
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agencies train staff, they communicat their ideological views
towards adoption and guardianship.202
The bottom line, according to the federal government,
is that “[r]egardless of a State’s official policy, caseworkers
exercise a fair amount of control over the rule-out process,”
specifically whether to tell foster families about guardianship
and whether and how to involve them in ruling out
adoption.203 Surveys of caseworkers in jurisdictions offering
subsidized guardianship found that 30 to 56 percent of
caseworkers disagree with the statement “guardianship is just
as permanent as adoption.”204 Caseworkers choose not to even
inform 267 of the 1197 eligible families that subsidized
guardianship was an option, effectively pushing the families
toward adoption.205 Surveys of some relative caregivers reflect
that many were not informed by their caseworker that
financial subsidies were even available with guardianship.206
Many others said that they were not involved in permanency
discussions with their caseworker at all.207 Unsurprisingly, an
agency’s or caseworker’s decision to tell caregivers that
guardianship was an option had a significant impact on
whether those caregivers sought guardianship or adoption. For
instance, nearly three times as many Tennessee caregivers
who were not informed about guardianship sought adoption
than those who did.208
Even when caseworkers describe both adoption and
guardianship to foster parents, that does not mean that
caseworkers explain the options fully, without pressure (subtle
or otherwise) to choose adoption over guardianship. Eliza
202

Id. at 28.
Id.
204
Testa, Evaluation of Interventions, supra note 24, at 204.
205
Id. at 213.
206
Making It Work, supra note 11, at 14.
207
Synthesis of Findings, supra note 25, at 22.
208
Id. at 21.
203
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Patten tells of one case in which a foster parent knew that both
adoption and guardianship would let her raise her foster child
until majority, but could not explain any differences between
the two.209 Patten suggests that the caseworker did not help the
foster parent understand that adoption required termination of
the parent-child relationship while guardianship did not, or
that guardianship would guarantee a right to parent-child
contact, while adoption would only do so with a post-adoption
contact agreement.210 It is not hard to imagine how
caseworkers could inform foster parents of all permanency
options while still steering them to the agency-preferred
option. In addition, such caseworker counseling could breeze
over differences between adoption with and without a postadoption contract agreement, or push a family to accept
whichever option the agency preferred or thought would lead
to the speediest resolution, rather than what the family thinks
truly best. The complexity of the options suggests the need for
counseling by someone familiar with the legal options and
legal procedures for obtaining those options, and who can talk
confidentially with the foster parent about which option best
suits their goals. In other words, it requires counseling by a
lawyer for the foster parent, not a state actor.211
3.
Children and Families
Should Have a Greater Say
The above analysis suggests that in many cases, child
welfare agencies effectively determine what permanency
arrangement best serves children’s needs. That reality is
problematic. Absent data showing different outcomes based
on legal status, the law should defer to the preferences of the

209

Patten, supra note 20, at 272. Patten wrote in 2004, before Fostering
Connections. Nothing in that law or anywhere else suggests that this
scenario does not repeat itself today.
210
Id.
211
Infra Part IV.F.
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individuals whose family relationships are at issue.212 Indeed,
the trend in family law more generally is to respect the
autonomy of individuals to order their family relationships.
The law now respects and enforces pre-nuptial (and even postnuptial) agreements. Many states enforce surrogacy
agreements. The Supreme Court has cast doubt on laws that
seek to enforce a particular vision of a proper family life in
favor of family arrangements that develop for sociological
reasons,213 and has more broadly cautioned “against attempts
by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or set its boundaries absent injury to a person or
abuse of an institution the law protects.”214 Over time, “family
law follows family life,” at least among those families
engaged in private family law cases.215
Perpetuating government agency control over which
permanency option should apply perpetuates the unfortunate
divide between “middle class family law” and poor people’s
family law.216 Middle and upper class families benefit from
the trends permitting them to define their own legal
arrangements, with minimal interference from the state.
Families with children in foster care are overwhelmingly
poor.217 The foster families who take care of foster children
212

See Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 34, 531 (concluding “that
the preferences of children and kin” should shape decisions between
adoption and guardianship).
213
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06; id. at 507-10
(Brennan, J., concurring) (1977).
214
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
215
JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE
CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 2 (2011).
216
Id. at 2 (distinguishing “middle-class family law” from poor people’s
family law); Jill Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the
Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002).
217
Children from impoverished families endure significantly more abuse
and neglect than their richer counterparts. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMANS SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, OFFICE OF
PLANNING, RES., AND EVALUATION, FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY
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(especially kinship families) have low enough income that the
government provides foster care subsidies to enable them to
take care of the children, and adoption and guardianship
subsidies to incentivize permanency.
When determining whether adoption or guardianship is
most appropriate, families—including the child’s caregiver,
the child’s parents, and (as is age appropriate) the child—
deserve the same respect to choose the arrangement that best
suits their needs as middle class families have. If we are going
to trust someone to raise a child in state custody through
adulthood and make all the decisions inherent in raising a
child, surely we should trust that person enough to at least
have a strong voice regarding what legal status would be best
for the child. Concentrating authority in child protection
agencies undermine this principle.
III.

District of Columbia: A Case Study Illustrating the
New Permanency

Adoption does not need to continue subordinating
guardianship. Full implementation of the new permanency
would likely lead to significantly different permanency
outcomes, with fewer children growing up in foster care, more
guardianships, and likely fewer adoptions. These results
should be embraced because they would lead to more children
leaving foster care to permanent homes, and provide more
flexible options to best reflect each child’s situation, and in
particular, their ongoing relationship (if one exists) with
biological parents and other family members. The empirical
record should silence any concerns that expanded
guardianship would somehow lead to less safe or less lasting
options. Yet, as discussed in Part II, the national child welfare
system still has not fully implemented the new permanency,

OF CHILD

(2010).

ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4) REPORT TO CONGRESS 5-11–5-12
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and Congress’s significant step towards the new permanency
in 2008 seems to have no discernible effect across the country.
The District of Columbia provides a counter-example
to that national trend, and illustrates how permanency might
look if other jurisdictions fully embraced the new permanency.
The District offers a wide range of permanency options,
including subsidized kinship and (since 2010) non-kinship
guardianship and post-adoption contact agreements. The
District has a long-standing administrative structure to
facilitate kinship placements, and the vast majority of its
kinship placements are in licensed foster homes. Moreover,
the District’s legal services structure can help ensure that most
(if not all) families are familiar with all permanency options
and can be counseled regarding the best option for them, and
that some advocacy exists for kinship placements. The District
has a well-established office to provide guardian ad litem
representation for children,218 parents’ attorneys who must
apply to and be approved by the court to work in child welfare
cases,219 and a wide set of pro bono attorneys to represent
prospective guardians or adoptive parents.220 In addition, the
District has an active foster parent advocacy organization.221
218

The Children’s Law Center provides guardian ad litem representation
for 500 children annually. Michael Fitzpatrick: Director, Guardian Ad
Litem
Program,
CHILDREN’S
LAW
CENTER,
http://www.childrenslawcenter.org/profile/michael-fitzpatrick (last visited
Oct. 25, 2014). In full disclosure, the author worked at the Children’s Law
Center from 2005-2011. Attorneys who have been approved by the court to
work in child welfare cases provide the remainder of guardian ad litem
representation. District of Columbia Courts: CCAN Practitioner,
http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/legal/
ccan.jsf.
219
Id.
220
The Children’s Law Center: Pro Bono Attorney FAQs,
http://www.childrenslawcenter.org/content/pro-bono-attorneyfaqs#Types_of_cases.
221
FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE PARENT ADVOCACY CENTER,
http://www.dcfapac.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
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Permanency outcomes in the District reflect what
research into guardianship would predict, but which has not
happened nationally since Fostering Connections. In the
District, there has been a steady decline in the importance of
termination of parental rights proceedings, and a steady
increase in the use of guardianships—which now exceed
adoption as the most frequent permanency option when
children cannot reunify with their parents.222 Given a range of
options, a majority of families now choose something other
than a termination and adoption. And the District’s data
suggests that overall permanency outcomes have improved,
although these statistics are less definitive.
The District’s experience also reveals the need for
further reforms to better make decisions among various
permanency providers and legal statuses. Despite a variety of
permanency options that appear to both help more foster
children leave foster care to permanent families and to do so
via the legal arrangement that best suits their families’ needs,
the absence of clear legal mechanisms to decide kinship
placement disputes, and the absence of adequate permanency
hearing procedures to determine what permanency goal best
serves children’s interests has led to a series of cases
presenting difficult and unnecessary disputes. In these cases,
biological families assert that a prospective kinship caregiver
was wrongly denied placement early in a case, but those
families only challenge the denial when appealing an adoption
by a non-kin foster parent years after the crucial placement
decision.

222

I do not suggest that any particular ratio between guardianships or
adoptions should occur nationally, or even that one should be more
prevalent than the other. Rather, I suggest that legal changes providing for
a continuum of options should lead to a greater reliance on the newer
options available.
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District of Columbia Permanency Options and
Outcomes

When a foster child cannot reunify with a parent, the
District offers a range of permanency options, including all
options discussed in this article except for non-exclusive
adoption. District law, like the law of all other states provides
for adoption.223 The District has also, since 2010, permitted
adoptive parents and biological parents and family members to
enter
into
court-enforceable
post-adoption
contact
agreements.224 District law also permits foster parents to seek
subsidized guardianships of foster children.225 Such subsidies
were limited to kin until 2010, when the D.C. Council made
both kin and non-kin eligible for subsidies.226
Since the D.C. Council expanded subsidized
guardianship to include both kin and non-kin, guardianship
has become the more frequently chosen permanency option, as
revealed in both administrative and judicial statistics.227

223

D.C. CODE § 16-301 et seq. (2001). As is the national norm, District
provides that an adoption extinguishes all legal relationships between a
foster child and his or her biological family, and creates new relationships
through the adoptive parents. D.C. CODE § 16-312 (2001).
224
Adoption Reform Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Law 18-230 (codified
at D.C. CODE § 4-361 (2001)). In full disclosure, as an attorney at the D.C.
Children’s Law Center at the time, I helped draft portions of this
legislation and advocated for its passage.
225
D.C. CODE § 16-2381 et seq. (2001).
226
D.C. CODE § 16-2399 (2001) provides for guardianship subsidies. D.C.
Law 18-230, § 502(b) (2010) (repealing D.C. CODE § 16-2399(b)(3)).
227
Somewhat disturbingly, the District’s child welfare agency and family
court report different numbers of both guardianships and adoptions.
Nonetheless, the overall numbers and trends are sufficiently similar that
both data sets support this section’s discussion.
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Table 1: Adoptions, guardianships, and permanency plans
of adoption or guardianship, per District of Columbia
administrative data, FY 2006–FY 2013
Year
2013228
2012229
2011230
2010231
2009232
2008233
2007234
2006235

228

Guardianships
151
111
129
73
88
108
143
184

Adoptions
105
112
105
130
108
119
160
186

GuardianshipAdoption ratio
1.44
0.99
1.23
0.56
0.81
0.91
0.89
0.99

CFSA, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 17, 23.
2012 D.C. GOV’T CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY ANN. PUB. REP.
at 27, 30, 33 (2013), [hereinafter CFSA, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT].
230
2011 D.C. GOV’T CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY ANN. PUB. REP.
at 20, 26 (2012) [hereinafter CFSA, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT].
231
CFSA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 191, at 21, 27.
232
2009 D.C. GOV’T CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY ANN. PUB. REP.
at 29, 35 (2010).
233
2008 D.C. GOV’T CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY ANN. PUB. REP.
at 26, 34 (2009).
234
2007 D.C. GOV’T CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY ANN. PUB. REP.
at 17, 23 (2008).
235
2006 D.C. GOV’T CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY ANN. PUB. REP.
at 15, 21 (2007).
229
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Table 1: Adoptions, guardianships, and permanency plans

of adoption or guardianship, per District of Columbia
administrative data, FY 2006–FY 2013 (continued)
Year

2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006

Permanency
plans of
guardianship
395
401
378
336
284
256
288
349

Permanency
plans of
adoption
290
324
361
415
491
507
519
565

GuardianshipAdoption plans
ratio
1.36
1.24
1.44
0.81
0.57
0.50
0.55
0.62

Judicial statistics report an even more pronounced
increase in guardianship cases—from 14 percent of all cases
closed in 2009 to 28 percent in 2013236—and a simultaneous
increase in the ratio of guardianship permanency plans to
adoption permanency plans.

236

2013 D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 58–59 (2014)
[hereinafter DC FAMILY COURT 2013 REPORT]. The Court reports 617
cases that closed after an initial disposition, 78 percent of which—481
cases—closed via some form of permanency (and not to the child
emancipating from foster care). Id. at 58. Of those cases, 28 percent—135
cases—closed to guardianship and 17 percent—82 cases—closed to
adoption. Id. at 59.
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Table 2: Adoptions and guardianship per District of
Columbia judicial data, FY 2004-2013
Year

Cases closed
to
guardianship

Cases
closed to
adoption

2013238
2012239
2011240
2010241
2009242
2008243
2007244
2006245
2005246
2004247

135
160
158
108
93
93
110
192
210
292

82
122
110
112
128
95
135
197
279
421

237

Guardianship to
Adoption
ratio
1.65
1.31
1.43
0.096
0.72
0.97
0.81
0.97
0.75
0.69

Guardianship to
Adoption
plans ratio237
1.25
1.45
1.17
1.00
0.71
0.55
0.57
0.57
0.48
0.65

The court’s annual reports list the permanency plans as a percentage of
the plans in all open cases. They do not list the absolute numbers of cases
with each permanency plan. E.g., id. at 54. I thus list only the ratios,
calculated by dividing the percentage of cases with guardianship plans by
the percentage of cases with adoption plans. Raw numbers are found at id.
at 54, 2012 D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 48 (2013); 2011
D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 51 (2012); 2010 D.C. SUPER.
CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 57 (2011); 2009 D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY
COURT ANN. REP. 49 (2010); 2008 D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY COURT ANN.
REP. 56 (2009); 2007 D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 50
(2008); 2006 D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 46 (2007); 2005
D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 50 (2006); 2004 D.C. SUPER.
CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 40 (2005).
238
DC Family Court 2013 Report, supra note 236, at 58–59.
239
2012 D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 55 (2013).
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
2009 D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 57 (2010).
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
2006 D.C. SUPER. CT. FAMILY COURT ANN. REP. 51 (2007).
246
Id.
247
Id.
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Strikingly, both the agency and court data reflect a
significant increase in the ratio of guardianships to adoptions,
and guardianship permanency plans to adoption permanency
plans—both over the past decade, and with a sharp increase
that coincides with the 2010 addition of subsidized nonkinship guardianship as a permanency plan. Through this
legislation, the District took advantage of federal dollars
provided by Fostering Connections (which reimbursed the
District for the kinship guardianship subsidies it had been
providing for years) to expand guardianship subsidies and thus
provide a particularly wide range of permanency options. Such
expansion of subsidized guardianship is precisely what
Fostering Connections enabled for the majority of states that
had offered such subsidies with their own dollars before 2008.
Both data sets reflect a sharp increase from 2010, when the
legislation was enacted, to 2011, the first full year it was in
effect. Those increases are evident in the below graphs.
Figure 1: Guardianship to Adoption and Permanency Plan
Ratios per administrative data
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Figure 2: Guardianship to Adoption and Permanency Plan
Ratios per judicial data
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The 2010 legislation appears to have shifted the
permanency balance towards guardianship. The 2010
legislation expanded guardianship subsidies to non-kin,
extended adoption and guardianship subsidy eligibility from
18 to 21 (to coincide with foster care eligibility in the
District248),
and
established
post-adoption
contact
249
agreements. Perhaps non-kin foster parents were interested
in guardianships, and making subsidies available led them to
pursue it.250 Or perhaps foster parents of older children—who
might be more inclined towards guardianship—were
particularly affected by extending subsidy eligibility until age
21.

248

See D.C. CODE § 16-2303 (2001) (providing that Family Court
jurisdiction over a youth extends until s/he turns 21).
249
Adoption Reform Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Law 18-230 §§ 101
(post-adoption contact agreement), 501 (extending adoption and
guardianship subsidy eligibility to age 21), & 502(b) (repealing provision
limiting guardianship subsidy eligibility to kin).
250
See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing non-kin foster
families’ interest in guardianship).
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These statistics also reflect a significant change in the
paths cases take towards permanency. One of the most striking
figures is the sharp decline in the number of cases with a
permanency plan of adoption. Nearly 250 fewer cases had a
permanency goal of adoption in 2012 than in 2006, and the
ratio of adoption goals to guardianship goals moved from
nearly twice as many adoptions to somewhat more
guardianship goals.
The permanency plan statistics are noteworthy because
they suggest changes in how child abuse and neglect cases are
handled before an actual permanency trial occurs, which has a
significant impact on the frequency of termination of parental
rights cases. By setting fewer plans of adoption and more
goals of guardianship, the District of Columbia court system is
identifying cases for which a termination is not necessary.251
Therefore, the decrease in adoption plans has led to a dramatic
decrease in termination cases, reported in Table 3.252
Relatedly, these changes do not appear to have
changed the number of actual adoptions, which have remained
relatively steady. Rather, the growth of guardianship plans has
much more significantly reduced the number of cases with a
plan of adoption, and the termination of parental rights cases
that often followed. It seems that the courts used to set
adoption goals that were never achieved, and are now making

251

There is a direct connection between the permanency goals set and the
number of termination cases filed. The child protection agency in the
District of Columbia required its attorneys to file a termination motion
within 45 days of the Family Court setting a permanency plan of adoption.
DC FAMILY COURT 2012 REPORT, supra note 236 at 63.
252
The fluctuation in the number of termination motions filed in the mid2000s results from efforts to reduce a backlog of cases in which the agency
sought a termination—leading to higher numbers of cases in 2005 and a
fall off in 2006. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, FAMILY
COURT 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 65 (2008) [hereinafter DC FAMILY COURT
2007 REPORT].
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more accurate permanency plan decisions, as well as avoiding
unnecessary termination filings.
Table 3: Termination cases, per judicial data, FY 2003-FY
2012
Year
2013253
2012254
2011255
2010256
2009257
2008258
2007259
2006260
2005261
2004262
2003263

Termination of parental rights cases filed
66
77
67
83
129
161
129
145
248
141
177

Fostering Connections and the 2010 legislation also
appear to have coincided with six years of steady overall
improvement in permanency outcomes. The percentage of
children emancipating from foster care (rather than leaving
foster care to a reunification or a new permanent family)
peaked in 2008 (when Fostering Connections was enacted) at
34 percent of all exits.264 That figure decreased to 29 percent
in 2010 (when the District legislation was enacted) and
253

DC FAMILY COURT 2013 REPORT, supra note 235, at 68.
DC FAMILY COURT 2012 REPORT, supra note 236, at 63.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 62–63.
258
Id. at 62.
259
DC FAMILY COURT 2007 REPORT, supra note 236, at 64.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
DC FAMILY COURT 2013 REPORT, supra note 235, at 65.
254
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decreased further to 22 percent in 2013.265 At the same time,
there has been a small overall increase in the number of
children who could not reunify yet who left foster care to a
new permanent family instead of remaining in foster care until
they emancipated. The combined number of adoptions and
guardianships decreased from 2006 to a nadir in 2008 or 2009
(depending on whether one relies on the agency or court data),
and subsequently increased to a new peak in 2013.266 Those
recent increases are more impressive when considered in the
context of a dramatic and steady decrease in the overall foster
care population from 2,313 in 2006,267 to 1,318 by 2013.268
Still, more time is likely needed to determine if the
permanency increase is lasting. There is a lag time between
entries into foster care and adoptions and guardianships, most
of which occur more than 24 months after the agency first
places children in foster care.269 Entries have steadily
decreased since 2010 and were down nearly 50 percent in
2013 as compared with 2010.270 It remains to be seen whether
the permanency numbers will decline, and if so by how much,
as those smaller cohorts of foster children reach the stage of
their cases in which adoption or guardianship would be
considered.
The District data does give some pause about the
growth of guardianship by reporting that a quarter or more of
all guardianships disrupt within a few years of finalization,
while comparable statistics for adoptions are negligible.271
These statistics are grounds for caution, but do not prove that
adoptions are more stable than guardianships for several
265

Id.
Supra Tables 1 and 2.
267
CFSA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 191, at 21.
268
CFSA, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 15.
269
E.g., id. at 34.
270
CFSA, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 15.
271
See DC FAMILY COURT 2013 REPORT, supra note 235, at 66 (listing
adoption and guardianship disruption rates).
266
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reasons. First, they undercount adoption disruptions due to
unique features of the District.272 Second, they over count
guardianship disruptions—the Family Court reports that “[i]n
many instances these guardianship placements disrupt due to
the death or incapacity of the caregiver,” which leads to brief
foster care orders until the court formally appoints successor
guardians; unfortunately, the Court does not report what it
means by “many instances.”273 Third, and perhaps most
importantly, the District data does not describe differences
between foster children who are adopted and those who leave
foster care to live with guardians. Older children and children
with greater behavioral health and other problems are more
likely to suffer disruptions from either adoptions or
guardianships. Controlling for such differences is essential for
accurate comparisons, especially because children who leave
to guardianship tend to be older. Controlling for such
differences in other rigorous studies found no statistically
significant differences.274 Fourth, the District has a high rate of
adoption disruptions before finalizations—25 out of every 100
pre-adoptive
placements
disrupt275—suggesting
that
troublesome adoptive placements occur but disrupt before

272

Many, if not most, adoptions are with families who live in the District’s
Maryland or Virginia suburbs. If such adoptions disrupt, children would
enter foster care in their new home state, not the District, and, thus, would
not show up in the District Family Court data. In one extreme case, Renee
Bowman adopted three District of Columbia foster children and lived with
them in Maryland. Bowman murdered two of them, and the third escaped
and was placed in Maryland foster care. Dan Morse, Adoptive mom
accused of killing kids and freezing bodies goes on trial in Md., WASH.
POST,
(Feb.
18,
2010)
http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021705194.html. The surviving child
would not be counted as re-entering District foster care, though her
adoptive home quite obviously disrupted.
273
DC FAMILY COURT 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 235, at 67.
274
See generally supra note 67 and accompanying text.
275
CFSA, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 25.
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adoption finalization, while troublesome guardianship
placements occur but do not disrupt until after finalization.
The District’s available data does not answer other
questions conclusively. The data does not distinguish between
kinship and non-kinship guardianships or adoptions, and does
not count the number of adoptions that occurred with or
without a post-adoption contact agreement. The law that
governs the District’s data collection and reporting has,
unfortunately, not kept up with developments in the District’s
permanency law.276 Data collection that reflects the new
permanency would yield even more valuable information
about how new permanency laws play out in practice.277
B.

The District’s Agency-focused Kinship Placement
Procedures

When the District of Columbia Child and Family
Services Agency removes children from their parents, it, like
any other child protection agency, must determine where to
place the children. This decision includes evaluating possible
kinship options. District data and District administrative
procedures suggest a strong value on kinship placements.
District-specific data suggests kinship care for District
foster children leads to similar positive outcomes as studies
from around the country would suggest.278 Agency data
consistently shows that children placed with kin are several
times more likely to have stable placements than children in
any other category of placement. For instance, in 2013,
children in kinship foster homes had 19 placement disruptions
276

D.C. CODE § 4-1303.03(b)(10) (2001) requires that the Agency publish
an annual report with certain data. That data includes statistics regarding
exits from foster care and permanency plan cited in this section, but do not
include breakdowns of kinship and non-kinship guardianships and
adoptions, or adoptions with and without contact agreements.
277
Infra Part IV.D.
278
Supra Part I.B.
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for every 100 placements. The figures were 33 for specialized
foster homes (which are usually used for children with
developmental disabilities or severe medical conditions), 40
for independent living programs, 53 for non-kinship foster
care, and 77 for group homes.279 In other words, kinship foster
placements are more than two and a half times more stable
than non-kinship foster placements. Similar statistics have
been reported for years.280 An analysis of District data also
demonstrates that foster children placed with kin are 31.7
percent more likely to leave foster care for adoption or
guardianship than other foster children.281
The District has established administrative policies and
procedures to facilitate kinship placements. First, the District
has adopted regulations to create more flexibility in
determining whether to grant particular family members foster
care licenses. Federal law permits states to waive “non-safety
standards (as determined by the State)” for kinship foster
homes.282 The District government has issued some policy

279

CFSA, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 25. This data does not
control for differences among children; children placed in kinship foster
homes may have less difficult behaviors, thus decreasing the likelihood of
placement disruptions. The District data is nonetheless consistent with
academic studies that do control for such variables. Supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
280
See CFSA, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 228, at 35 (18 disruptions
per 100 kinship foster home placements, compared to 60 for non-kinship
foster homes); see also CFSA, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 229 at
28 (16 disruptions per 100 kinship foster home placements, compared to 60
for non-kinship foster homes); CFSA, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
191, at 29 (21 disruptions per 100 kinship foster home placements,
compared to 60 for non-kinship foster homes).
281
MARY ESCHELBACH HANSEN & JOSH GUPTA-KAGAN, EXTENDING AND
EXPANDING ADOPTION AND GUARDIANSHIP SUBSIDIES FOR CHILDREN AND
YOUTH IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FOSTER CARE SYSTEM: FISCAL
IMPACT
ANALYSIS
10
(2009),
http://academic2.american.edu/~mhansen/fiscalimpact.pdf.
282
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10) (2010).
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guidance, identifying foster home regulations that it would
consider waiving for kinship placements.283
Moreover, the District has a long-standing
administrative mechanism to expedite the licensing procedures
for kinship foster homes.284 These policies establish a
“preference” for kinship placements and articulate how
kinship placements can “reduce the trauma of separation from
parents” and “provide children with an environment that
maintains family and cultural connections and provides for
familiarity, stability, and enduring loving relationships.”285
One result is that children in kinship care in the District live
with kin who have foster care licenses,286 and who are thus
283

See generally District of Columbia Child and Family Servs. Agency,
Temporary Licensing of Foster Homes for Kin, Attachment B: List of
Potentially
Waivable
Requirements,
(2011),
http://cfsa.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/cfsa/publication/attachments/Pr
ogram%20%20Temporary%20Licensing%20of%20Foster%20Homes%20for%20Kin
%20(final)(H)_1.pdf.
284
D.C. CODE MUN. REGS. tit. § 6027; District of Columbia Child and
Family Servs. Agency. Temporary Licensing of Foster Homes for Kin
(2011),
http://cfsa.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/cfsa/publication/attachments/Pr
ogram%20%20Temporary%20Licensing%20of%20Foster%20Homes%20for%20Kin
%20%28final%29%28H%29_1.pdf. The District has also established a
procedure to provide temporary licenses—and, thus, expedited
placements—for kin who live in Maryland, a particularly large population
given the District’s unique geography. District of Columbia Child and
Family Servs. Agency, Administrative Issuance CFSA 08-4 (2008),
http://cfsa.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/cfsa/publication/attachments/A
I%20-%20Emergency%
20Kinship%20Placements%20in%20Maryland%28final%29.pdf.
285
Temporary Licensing of Foster Homes for Kin, supra note 283, at 1.
286
In 2009, the District reported that 13 percent of its foster children were
placed in licensed kinship homes and 4 percent in unlicensed kinship
homes. Children’s Bureau, Report to Congress, supra note 80, at 6. The
reported unlicensed kinship homes are likely kin who have been
temporarily approved pending full licensure. Supra note 284.
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eligible for federally reimbursed guardianship subsidies at
permanency.287
In addition to foster care licensing policies, the District
also utilizes family team meetings (known by other names,
such as family group conferencing, in other jurisdictions) to
identify kinship placement options. In these meetings, family
members, social workers, other professionals, and sometimes
lawyers or advocates discuss whether a foster care placement
is necessary and what type of placement is most appropriate.
These meetings are held early in a case and so, like a kinship
foster home licensing decision, can shape future outcomes.
Meeting coordinators are charged with identifying extended
family members who can participate.288 The meetings’
purpose includes exploring the possibility of kinship
placements,289 and the District explicitly connects kinship
placement identification with “the identification of
permanency resources” and lists that as a core purpose of
family team meetings.290 Guardians ad litem and other lawyers
are often invited and can ensure that kin preferred by their
clients are invited to these meetings and considered as
placement and permanency options.291
Taken together, these administrative policies establish
a general preference for kinship placements and focus
287

42 U.S.C. § 673(d)(3)(A)(i)(II).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHILD AND FAMILY SERVS. AGENCY, FAMILY
TEAM MEETING (FTM) 3 (2013) [hereinafter CFSA, FAMILY TEAM
MEETING],
http://cfsa.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/cfsa/publication/attachments/Pro
gram%20-%20Family%20Team
%20Meeting%20%28FTM%29%28final%29.pdf.. Id. at 6-7.
289
Id. at 11. See also CFSA, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 9–10
(describing the “KinFirst initiative” to identify kinship placement options
through family team meetings and other steps).
290
CFSA, FAMILY TEAM MEETING, supra note 287, at 1.
291
Id. at 2 (directing agency staff to invite guardians ad litem) & 7
(encouraging attorneys to attend family team meetings).
288
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authority and discretion in the agency to make kinship
placement decisions, without providing significant due process
checks on agency decisions. A family member who is denied a
kinship foster home license may file an administrative
appeal.292 The family member would have no right to counsel
to file such an appeal, a significant obstacle for a low-income
individual. And the family member would have to wait until
the agency denies a full foster home license application; the
expedited approval process is not appealable.293 The full
application process can take about six months or longer.294 An
administrative appeal can take more than 100 days, not
counting time for any judicial appeal.295 In the meantime, the
child is living with another foster family and the reality of that
living arrangement may shape future decisions in the child’s
case. Unsurprisingly, very few such appeals are filed.296
The agency’s power regarding kinship care is evident
in recent increases in the number of children placed with kin.
In recent years, the agency administration has made a
concerted push to use the administrative tools described here
more effectively, and this effort has led to an increase in the
percentage of foster children in kinship care—up from 16
percent of all foster children in 2012 to 24 percent in 2013.297
There was no new rule of law applied in court, only a greater
292

D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29 § 6031.8 (2004).
D.C. MUN. REGS. tit 29 § 6027.8.
294
The agency has 150 days—about five months—to decide to grant or
deny a license. D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29 § 6028.5 (2012). That timeline is
triggered by the applicant beginning foster parent training; delays in the
training could thus trigger a longer licensing decisionmaking period.
295
The applicant has 30 days to file a fair hearing request. Id. at § 5903.4
(2002). A fair hearing must be scheduled within 45 days of that request,
but can be extended for good cause. Id. at § 5908.3. The hearing examiner
then has an additional 30 days to render a decision. Id. at § 5910.3.
296
A Westlaw search on May 20, 2014 for “‘Child and Family Services
Agency’ & foster & (care or home) & license & appeal” yielded no appeals
of agency denials of foster home licenses.
297
CFSA, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 11.
293
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administrative focus on kinship care. A 50 percent increase in
kinship placements driven by agency policies underscores the
power held by agencies—and not courts—to control how
many foster children live with kin.
C.

The Inability to Resolve Kinship Placement Issues
Early Leads to Difficult Permanency Litigation

No provision of District law governing judicial
decisions explicitly creates a preference for kinship
placements. Yet, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
has long required courts to give “weighty consideration” to a
parent’s preferred permanent custodian, and a competing
petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the parental preference is contrary to the child’s best
interests.298 This rule does create a kinship preference when,
as is often the case, a parent prefers their child to live with kin
rather than non-kin. Indeed, the rule arose when a child’s
great-aunt, preferred by the mother, sought custody of a foster
child while the child’s non-kinship foster parents sought to
adopt him.299 At least, it creates such a preference at the end of
a case—the appellate cases applying this rule have uniformly
done so in challenges to adoption or termination orders; the
rule has not been applied at earlier stages of a case.300 The
District law is thus similar to statutory preferences in 10 states
for placing children in kinship adoption homes when adoption
is the permanency plan.301 The District case law permits late298

In re T.J., 666 A.2d 1, 11, 16 (D.C. 1995).
Id. at 4.
300
See In re Ta.L., 75 A.3d 122, 128 (D.C. 2013) (reaffirming rule and
citing six cases applying it). The T.J. court wrote that “Our discussion
applies, of course, . . . to the placement of” a foster child. In re T.J., 666
A,.2d 1, 10 n.4 (D.C. 1995). The D.C. Court of Appeals has not decided
whether the “weighty consideration” rule applies to a foster care placement
decision or only at permanency. One trial court decision has declined to
apply the rule at a pre-permanency stage of the case. In re P.B., 2003 WL
21689579 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 2003).
301
Placement of Children with Relatives, supra note 174, at 4.
299
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stage challenges to agency case work to identify and
investigate potential kinship placements early in a case.
This body of case law reveals several core points. First,
decisions made well before a termination, adoption, or
guardianship case is litigated—where to place a foster child,
and what permanency plan to set—have tremendous impacts
on the ultimate permanency outcome. Second, when these
decisions are made wrongly, they lead to unnecessarily
difficult decisions about whether to move children from the
family they have lived with for years to live with a nonoffending parent302 or other family member303 whose requests
for custody were denied earlier in a case, without an
evidentiary hearing or clear findings to support that denial.
These problems illustrate the importance of improved
procedures for kinship placement and permanency plan
decisions earlier in a case.
Most recently, in In re Ta.L., the D.C. Court of
Appeals overturned an adoption by non-kinship foster parents
in 2013 because the trial court failed to give adequate weight
to the parents’ preference that the children live with and be
adopted by their great-aunt.304 (The case is now pending
before an en banc panel of the Court.305) The facts reveal
inadequate consideration of multiple kinship placements from
302

In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413 (D.C. 2009) overturned an adoption ordered
despite no finding that the father was unfit. The record reflected various
problems with the decision to set a permanency plan of adoption rather
than reunification with the father. See Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due
Process Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect Cases between Disposition and
Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 139, 170 (2010) [hereinafter GuptaKagan, Due Process Donut Hole].
303
In re T.W.M., 964 A.2d 595 (D.C. 2009), overturned an adoption
because the mother’s preferred caregiver, a family member, was not given
adequate consideration. See also In re D.M., 86 A.3d 584 (D.C. 2014)
(vacating an order granting an adoption and remanding for consideration of
mother’s preferred custodian, her mother-in-law).
304
In re Ta.L., 75 A.3d 122, 125 (D.C. 2013).
305
In re R.W., 91 A.3d 1020
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the first days of the case. Two days after removing the
children in 2008 from their parents, the agency identified two
extended family members as potential placements, the
children’s adult sister and great-aunt. The family decided that
the sister would pursue a placement first, but her husband, the
children’s brother-in-law, failed the background test. The
agency never contacted the great-aunt, and the great-aunt did
not contact the agency after she was told that the plan was to
reunify the children with their mother.306 These facts raise a
number of questions about kinship placement. First, why did
the brother-in-law fail the background test, and should the
agency have waived whatever background issue that existed?
Was his conviction for a violent or non-violent crime, and did
he pose a real risk to the children? As the sister was going to
serve as the children’s primary caretaker, could she have
mitigated any risk posed by the brother-in-law? Second, why
did concurrent planning for permanency not include outreach
to the great-aunt as soon as the agency ruled out the sister?
Most fundamentally, the background to In re Ta.L.
raises the question: why did the law not provide the children—
who should be expected to have done better living with family
members than with strangers—with greater protections before
ruling out kinship placements? The case reached a
permanency hearing in 2009, and the court changed the
children’s goal to adoption with the non-kinship foster
parents; a goal of guardianship or adoption with either kinship
placement option was not broached.307 Termination and
adoption litigation ensued within a month, and only then did a
social worker reach out to the great-aunt and initiate visits
between her and the children.308
This case was also notable because the parent and
great-aunt’s appeal challenged the permanency hearing
306

In re Ta.L., 75 A.3d at 125–26.
Id. at 126.
308
Id. at 126.
307
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decision, changing the goal to adoption.309 The court
recognized the “compelling case” that permanency hearing
decisions ought to be appealable because “a right to appeal at
this stage is necessary in order to ensure that this court will
have the opportunity to timely address alleged trial court
errors that could significantly impact the ultimate outcomes in
permanency cases.”310 Indeed, better procedures earlier in the
case could have avoided the unnecessary conflict in In re
Ta.L. In that case, the great-aunt in In re Ta.L. was an
excellent candidate for kinship placement. The child welfare
agency granted her a therapeutic foster home license, and a
social worker deemed her home fit.311 She was raising the
children’s half-sibling and the trial court found that the sibling
“has done very well in [the great-aunt’s] care.”312 Federal law
rightly suggests that child welfare agencies place siblings
together because of the benefits of such placements to
children.313 The trial court concluded that the aunt “ably
direct[s] the children’s play, set[s] appropriate limits, ha[s] a
nice manner with the children, and [i]s attuned to their needs,”
and expressed no doubts about her fitness.314 The only factor
possibly outweighing a placement with the aunt were the
bonds that formed with the non-kinship foster home—bonds
309

Id. at 128–30.
Id. at 130 n.4. The Court cited to an amicus brief making this argument.
In full disclosure, that brief cited a similar argument that I made. Brief of
Amicus Curiae Legal Aid Society 7, 18, 19, (citing Gupta-Kagan, Due
Process Donut Hole, supra note 302) (on file with author).
311
In re Ta.L., 75 A.3d at 126.
312
Id. at 131 n.6.
313
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(31) (2010), Godsoe, supra note 79, at 1124.
Congress recently strengthened the federal law’s push for considering
sibling placement by requiring states to notify the parents of a child’s
siblings when the state first places that child in foster care. Preventing Sex
Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113-183, § 209
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(29). It is not clear from the reported panel
decision if the sibling was placed in the great-aunt’s home before or after
the older two children were placed in the non-kinship foster home.
314
In re Ta.L., 75 A.3d at 127; see also id. 131 & n.6 (same).
310
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that never would have existed had the agency and courts
followed a strong kinship preference early in the case.
In re Ta.L. is illustrative of a set of District of
Columbia cases with two themes in common. First, the legal
errors at issue occurred early in a case, potentially setting the
case on a bad course that did not come to appellate courts’
attention until after a termination or adoption decree was
entered. Second, the legal errors involved the courts and the
agency giving inadequate deference to kinship placements.
Coupled with the court’s recent acknowledgement that
permanency goal decisions shape the ultimate outcome of the
case, these themes illuminate why stronger legal rules
prioritizing placement with kin, and stronger legal remedies to
enforce such rules at earlier stages of the case are essential.
Otherwise, courts will choose the wrong permanency plan and
start a course towards an unnecessary termination.
In re Ta.L. also demonstrates how existing law is
inadequate to address these problems. As discussed above, the
District has a body of law designed to facilitate kinship foster
care placements—but this law gives discretion to the child
welfare agency to decide whether to make such placements
without giving the family court a meaningful check on such
decisions. The rule applied in In re Ta.L.—that parents’
choice of permanent caregivers must be granted weighty
consideration does not provide such a check. Such a right is
framed only in reference to permanency decisions, not earlier
placement decisions,315 so it does not get asserted until much
time has passed and a permanency decision is all but final—
after the children at issue have bonded with the prospective
adoptive family.
In addition, the parents’ rights-based rule applied in In
re Ta.L. provides an awkward path towards a kinship
preference. Parents who cannot raise their children surely have
315

Supra note 300 and accompanying text.
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an interest in with whom their children live and whether they
would retain any rights to be considered the child’s parent or
to contact or visit the child. Nonetheless, a rule focused on the
parents’ wishes is easily criticized for relying on the judgment
of a parent found unfit.316 Moreover, parents’ placement
choices may not always further a policy preference for kinship
placements; a parent with a fraught relationship with a family
member who is closely bonded to the child may hesitate
before endorsing that family member’s desire to have the child
placed in her custody. The parent may worry that she is more
likely to lose custody permanently if the child is placed with
kin. Or a parent may prefer placement with one family
member over another for reasons relating to the parent’s
relationship with those family members rather than their
relationship with the child.
A kinship placement preference should exist because
such preferences are generally better for children, especially
(although not exclusively) when the kin at issue have an
existing bond with the child. Such a preference should not
depend on the parents’ wishes. Such a preference should apply
at the earliest stages of a case, to mitigate the emotional
difficulty inherent in removing children from their parents,
and to avoid the unnecessary dilemmas inherent in
determining a later custody fight between a family member
improperly excluded from consideration as a kinship

316

Brief of amici curiae law professors James G. Dwyer, J. Herbie
Difonzo, Jennifer A. Drobac, Deobrah L. Forman, William Ladd, Ellen
Marrus, and Deborah Paruch in Support of Appellees, In re Ta.L., 13–14
(2014) (on file with author). Still, parents who are unfit to have physical
custody are not necessarily unfit to offer decisive input regarding who
should have such custody. Indeed, in private adoptions, the trend has been
to increase the authority of birth mothers relinquishing custody of their
children to select adoptive parents. Sanger, supra note 28, at 315. Many
(certainly not all) such birth mothers may relinquish custody because they
are unfit to raise the child, yet still maintain the right to select parents.
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placement and a non-kinship foster family that has bonded to
the child.
IV.

Implications of the New Permanency and Areas for
Legislative and Practice Reform

Families and courts now face a continuum of choices
in determining which legal status will best serve a child when
reunification is not possible; that continuum is a core feature
of the new permanency. How to implement it remains
unresolved. Will child welfare law continue to subordinate
guardianship and fail to take advantage of all options on the
continuum? Or will the national practice tend more toward
what has occurred in the District of Columbia and what
studies of guardianship programs predict, with a greater
proportion of cases leading towards guardianship, significantly
fewer terminations, and overall improvements in permanency
outcomes? The latter would enable more children to leave
foster care to permanent families, help children maintain
relationships with their biological families when appropriate,
and respect the wishes of foster and biological families to
choose the best legal option for their particular needs. The
national statistics, however, show that despite the Fostering
Connections Act’s federal funding for subsidized
guardianship, we remain far from full implementation of the
new permanency.
Full implementation will require treating adoption and
guardianship as comparably permanent legal statuses – which
they are, according to the empirical record discussed in Part I.
Congress has recently taken a small step to reduce inequities
between adoptions and guardianships. Until 2014, the federal
government had given states financial incentives to increase
the numbers of adoptions. Under 2014 legislation, those
incentives are now available for states that improve the rates
of children reaching permanency through both adoption and
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guardianship.317 Congress unfortunately left the other
disparities between adoption and guardianship discussed
throughout this article intact. But Congress’ willingness to
erase one disparity shows the possibility of erasing others in
both state and federal law.
This section will propose other reforms essential to
fully implement the new permanency. First, deciding which
permanency option to pursue should be based on the
individual child and family dynamics at issue in a case—and
not by any imposed hierarchy of permanency options. Second,
procedural protections for all individuals should be on par
with the real-world results of each permanency option. Third,
kinship preferences should be made more explicit and
enforceable in court early in cases. Fourth, permanency
hearings are essential steps and should have procedural
protections commensurate with their importance. Fifth, these
protections should include quality legal counsel for all
relevant parties—including, once a permanency plan is
changed away from reunification, counsel for likely
permanency resources.
A.
The Permanency Hierarchy Is Obsolete, and All
Families Should Have Equal Access to the Full Continuum of
Permanency Options
Congress and state legislatures should abolish the
hierarchy between adoption and guardianship.318 At the very
least, Congress should repeal the requirement of an adoption
over guardianship hierarchy as a condition of federal
guardianship subsidy funding. This requirement ossifies the
law and prevents states from experimenting with alternative
317

Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No.
113-183, 202.
318
I am not the first to recommend this step. E.g., Godsoe, supra note 79,
at 1135 (“My final recommendation is the elimination of the adoption ruleout.”).
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approaches to permanency.319 Courts should first determine if
reunification remains an appropriate permanency plan. If not,
courts should determine which permanency plan serves the
child’s best interests—and any general preference for one
permanency plan over another should not be a permissible
consideration. By rejecting a hierarchy of permanency goals,
this statutory reform would reject the ideology that the best
permanency option is the most legally binding one320 in favor
of one based on research demonstrating that various options
along the permanency continuum are equally lasting and
beneficial for children.321
To ensure full equality among permanency options,
subsidies provided by the state and federal governments
should be equal across these options. Congress and state
legislatures should repeal limitations on guardianship
subsidies to kin and should ensure that agencies provide
comparable subsidies to adoptive parents and guardians so that
no financial incentive exists to choose one permanency option
over another.
If legislatures remove the legal hierarchy of
permanency options, family courts will be faced with difficult
decisions about what permanency plan to select for each child.
Those decisions are very important, and will be discussed
below.322 Most importantly for this section, courts should not
make these decisions by using short cuts based on disproven
assumptions regarding one permanency option being more
permanent than another.
Relatedly, removing the legal hierarchy will require
renewed focus on when terminations of parental rights are
319

Vivek Sankaran, Innovation Held Hostage: Has Federal Intervention
Stifled Efforts to Reform the Child Welfare System?, 41 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 281 (2007–2008)
320
Supra Part II.B.
321
Supra Part I.A.1.
322
Infra Part IV.E.
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necessary. Rather than presume that the length of time in
foster care suggests a need for termination and adoption, law
and practice should presume that such facts only calls for a
close analysis of what permanency plan is best for an
individual child. Terminations should logically be reserved for
when they are truly necessary—that is, when all permanency
options not requiring terminations have been excluded, and the
parties (especially foster parents and biological parents) have
explored the possibility of agreeing to some consensual
arrangement. At the least, this means expanding exceptions to
the rule requiring termination filings to include any case with
a permanency plan of guardianship, even if the child is not
living with relatives.323
The empirical record discussed above resolves one
point of historical dispute—guardianship is just as permanent
as adoption.324 In light of that evidence, there is no compelling
justification for continuing to place adoption over
guardianship in a permanency hierarchy. Requiring any rule
out of adoption before establishing a guardianship does not
further children’s permanency because adoption is no more
permanent than guardianship. Rather, this hierarchy skews
decision-making, and directs courts and agencies to determine
permanency plans based on the hierarchy rather than each
child and family’s individual situation.
The hierarchy also interferes with the families having
meaningful choices among permanency options by
empowering agencies to hide the availability of subsidized
guardianship from families, or to pressure them to choose
adoption over guardianship.325 That absence of choice is a
problem by itself, as families should have the ability to select
the most appropriate legal status for their situation. It may also
interfere with a core benefit of the new permanency—
323

Supra note 115 and accompanying text (noting such exceptions).
Supra notes 39–54 and accompanying text.
325
Supra Part II.E.2.
324
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increasing the number of children who leave foster care to
permanent families by offering those families a greater variety
of legal statuses. Removing the hierarchy would eliminate the
need for any kind of rule-out procedure, and thus remove one
core area in which the law permits agency and case worker
discretion to prevent caregivers from learning about all
permanency options; case workers could no longer justify
failing to discuss subsidized guardianship by noting that
adoption had not been ruled out.
State agencies and courts should take steps to ensure
family court events reflect the equality of various permanency
options. For instance, courts should replace their annual
“adoption day” events326 with “permanent families day”
events. Such small but symbolic efforts can help change the
cultural subordination of guardianship discussed in Part II.C.
B.
Procedural Protections Before Establishing
Guardianships Should Be on Par with Their Permanency
A key pillar of this article’s argument is the strong data
showing that guardianships are just as stable and permanent as
adoptions. This data shows why the law should not impose a
general hierarchy between adoption and guardianship, and
should instead defer to families’ choices about which legal
status best serves their needs. This pillar also supports a
related proposition: because guardianships are similarly
permanent to adoptions, the procedural rights applied to them
should be more analogous to adoptions than they are in current
law. Just as no hierarchy should exist presenting adoption as
generally preferable, no hierarchy should exist rendering one
permanency option generally simpler procedurally than
another.327 Case law that justifies reduced procedural
protections because of guardianship’s allegedly temporary
326
327

Supra notes 140-146 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.D (summarizing procedural differences).
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nature should be reevaluated;328 although the legal possibility
of undoing guardianships exists, the statistical improbability
of such developments counsels strongly against providing
weaker procedural protections.
Some might argue that terminating parental rights—
often called the “civil death penalty”—remains so much more
severe than guardianship that different procedural protections
may reasonably apply. This argument has some force because
terminations remove all parental rights permanently; while
guardianships leave some contact rights intact, are subject to
modification, and do not take the title of legal parent away
from biological parents.329 But this argument ought not be
exaggerated, especially in light of the evolution of the
permanency continuum. Adoptions (which, of course, usually
require terminations) can also preserve a birth parent’s contact
rights.330 Terminations are increasingly reversible (though still
not to the same extent as guardianships).331 And adoptions no
longer necessitate removing the title of legal parent.332 Most
fundamentally, the technical differences between adoption and
guardianship simply do not amount to any empirical
differences in how long the action will limit the parent’s care,
custody, and control of their child.
One might object that stronger procedural protections
for biological parents in guardianship cases may weaken or
328

E.g. case law discussed supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 32, at __ (describing importance of
holding the legal title of “parent”).
330
Supra notes74–75 and accompanying text.
331
Lashanda Taylor, Resurrecting Parents of Legal Orphans: UnTerminating Parental Rights, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 318 (2010).
Taylor identified seven states which had adopted restoration of parental
rights statutes. Id. at 332–34. A 2012 survey identified nine such states.
National Conference of State Legislatures: Reinstatement of Parental
Rights,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/reinstatement-ofparental-rights-state-statute-sum.aspx (last visited 12 May 2014).
332
Supra notes76–77 and accompanying text.
329
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remove one of the appeals of guardianship over adoption.
Guardianship provides a “simpler judicial process” because no
termination is required,333 and the result would reduce one of
the empirical benefits of guardianship—that children can leave
foster care faster.334 Greater protections are still essential
because guardianship represents a severe and lasting limitation
on the parent-child relationship, even if such protections
slowed permanency.
But even with heighted protections, guardianship
should still lead to faster permanency in many cases. An
incentive in most cases should exist to pursue the permanency
option that can win the consent of a child’s birth parents; such
consent will obviate the need for a trial and thus lead to a
simpler judicial process. A consent guardianship should
facilitate a better ongoing relationship between guardians and
parents, which generally benefit the child. A simpler judicial
process through consent of the parties differs from a simpler
judicial process through reduced protections. Consent reflects
an agreement of the parties to a solution they believe parties
can best serve the family, rather than a flawed policy judgment
about a hierarchy of permanency options.
Accordingly, procedural protections for guardianship
should be enhanced so that they are roughly on par with
similarly
permanent
terminations
and
adoptions.
Guardianships should require proof of parental unfitness and
proof that the guardianship would serve the child’s best
interests. The standard of proof should be clear and
convincing evidence. Guardianship cases should be heard in
family court, under statutes designed to adjudicate foster care
333

Testa & Miller, supra note 14, at 415.
See Testa, Subsidized Guardianship, supra note 36, at 10 (noting that
children with guardianship as an option spent many days fewer on average
in foster care “[b]ecause of . . . the shorter time it takes to finalize legal
guardianships than adoptions because parental rights do not need to be
terminated”).
334
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and child maltreatment cases—not in probate court under
probate statutes.335
C.

Establish Stronger and More Enforceable Kinship
Placement Preferences

A strong policy base exists for preferring kinship care
to non-kinship care. First, such a preference respects existing
bonds that children have with family members.336 This factor
both accords respect for bonds that form organically, and
reflect caution about the state’s ability to forge better bonds
through a state-created non-kinship care foster family than
those that form naturally with kin. A kinship care preference
limits the severity of state intervention in families and is, thus,
consistent with the law’s general hesitance to permit such
intervention. Second, kinship care helps children obtain
important well-being outcomes, especially improved
placement stability and feelings of belongingness.337 Third,
kinship care likely leads to as good if not better permanency
outcomes than non-kinship care.338
Yet current law creates no enforceable placement
hierarchy, and this weakness is an important area for reform.
Child welfare agencies have some discretion regarding kinship
placements, but vary widely in their willingness to use them.
And the District of Columbia’s experience demonstrates that
such discretion can lead to unnecessarily difficult permanency
conflicts, even in a jurisdiction that embraces other elements
of the new permanency.
The law should enforce a specific kinship placement
preference that is binding on state agencies and can be
litigated in juvenile court. Federal funding laws should not
merely require states to “consider” a kinship care
335

Supra notes173–174and accompanying text.
Supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
337
Supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
338
Supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
336
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preference,339 but should require states to apply such a
preference. Federal officials should include such a preference
in their regular reviews of states’ child welfare performance,
on which federal funding depends. States that have unusually
small percentages of foster children living with kin should feel
pressure to improve such outcomes.340
State laws should empower courts to order kinship
placements when agencies unreasonably fail to make them.
The Indian Child Welfare Act may provide a simple model for
such a statute: just as an Indian foster child has the right to live
with kin unless a child protection agency can demonstrate
“good cause to the contrary”341 to a court, so should any nonIndian foster child. This reform would empower family courts
to serve as more meaningful checks on agency discretion
regarding kinship placement decisions. Courts could
determine if, for instance, an agency’s concern about a family
member’s partner’s five-year-old drug conviction is sufficient
to overcome that child’s bonds with her family member. This
balancing of power between branches of government might
also trigger other reforms—such as requiring a more flexible
interpretation of statutory provisions requiring agencies (not
courts) to maintain “responsibility” for a child,342 in particular
repealing the regulation prohibiting federal financial support
when a court orders a specific placement.343
339

Supra note 180180 and accompanying text.
Nationally, agencies place an average of 30 percent of foster children
with kin. Supra note 80. At least four states have rates below 15 percent—
Alabama (2 percent), Arkansas (12 percent), Georgia (11 percent), South
Carolina (7 percent)—and many states have not reported data. Children’s
Bureau, Report to Congress, supra note 80, at 6–7. A federal push to
improve performance would be indicated there.
341
Supra note 179 <<check this>> and accompanying text.
342
42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(B) (2010).
343
45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g)(3) (2012). For a discussion of present
interpretation of this regulation, see supra note 178 and accompanying
text.
340
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Such reforms would lead to earlier resolution of
kinship placement issues and thus help avoid the difficult
disputes that have occurred in District of Columbia cases
discussed in Part III.C. Consider cases in which the safety of a
kinship placement is disputed because of a family member’s
criminal background. Under current law, the family cannot
timely challenge the agency’s refusal to place the child with
this family member. If the dispute lingers, it could lead to
contested guardianship or adoption litigation years into the
case. But if a judge must decide early in a case whether the
criminal background amounts to good cause to overcome the
kinship placement—and if this decision was appealable at the
initial disposition—then such difficult litigation could be
avoided. If the kinship placement is best, that would be
resolved faster and the child placed with family sooner—
rather than after long litigation that unnecessarily creates and
then breaks bonds with a non-kin family. If the kinship
placement is not best, then that also would be established
sooner, effectively preventing the kin from mounting a later
challenge.344
A rule establishing a preference for kinship placements
would frame the issue as one of children’s rights to live in
placements indicated by research to be generally preferable,
rather than as a parental right to choose where the child lives.
That frame is more consistent with the reasons for a kinship
preference—that kinship care is better for children. Recall In
re Ta.L., the case involving unnecessary permanency litigation
because of a missed opportunity to achieve a kinship
placement; the great-aunt in that case would have been a good
placement for the children because she was a good caregiver
who could provide a home for the entire sibling group—not
because the children’s parent’s wanted the children living with
344

The kin might technically be able to file a competing guardianship or
adoption petition, but would have a hard time winning that if the courts had
already determined that the kin could not provide a safe placement.
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her.345 Focusing on those positive factors avoids the problem
of empowering a parent deemed unfit to control where a child
lives.346
To leverage the strong connection between kinship
placements and permanency outcomes, states should ensure
that children placed with kin are eligible for the full range of
subsidized permanency options available. That will require
states to more consistently use licensed kinship placements to
better take advantage of federally subsidized guardianships.347
That will require more effective use of kinship licensing
flexibility, and limiting unlicensed placements to exceptional
cases. When courts order children placed with kin, the law
should grant standing to parties supporting such a placement
(frequently the child and the parents) to fight for the kin to
obtain a foster care license, including filing an appeal of any
agency decision to deny such a license.
D.

Record Data to Study New Permanency Options

State and federal governments should report data that
reflects the new permanency, rather than the simplistic and
adoption-focused world reflected in Children’s Bureau
reports.348 The Children’s Bureau should require states to
report all relevant data to make sense of the new permanency
landscape. States should, ideally, start tracking this data on
their own initiative.
Relevant data should include, at a minimum, statistics
regarding the full continuum of permanency options. States
should not merely report the number of foster child adoptions
every year, but distinguish adoptions along at least two planes.
First, states should report varying types of adoptions—
traditional exclusive and closed adoptions, adoptions with
345

Supra notes 311–314 and accompanying text.
Supra note 316 and accompanying text.
347
Supra notes 187–188 and accompanying text.
348
Supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text.
346
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post-adoption contact agreements, and non-exclusive
adoptions. Second, states should report the number of kinship
and non-kinship adoptions. The data should reflect the
intersection of these two planes—so that the number of closed
kinship adoptions and non-kinship adoptions with contact
agreements are publicly reported. Similarly, guardianship data
should be reported, with clear data regarding kinship and nonkinship guardianships identified.
Data should also include the long-term stability of
various permanency options so it is clear how frequently
adoptions and guardianships disrupt, for what reasons, and
with what result (renewed foster care, reunification with a
biological parent, placement with a successor guardian, or
something else). With such data, scholars could seek to
confirm (or refute) findings discussed in this article that
guardianships are just as stable as adoptions, and policy
makers would have a much wider body of knowledge on
which to make decisions.
Moreover, the state and federal governments should
track and report adoption and guardianship data on an equal
footing. The Children’s Bureau should cease publishing
adoption-only publications and instead publish data on
permanency more generally, thus presenting a more accurate
picture of child welfare practice.
Finally, to better understand the interaction between
guardianship and adoption, states should report the number of
guardians who become adoptive parents. Several states have
indicated that for some families guardianship has “become a
bridge” between foster care and adoption.349 The 2008 federal
law providing limited federal funding for guardianship
subsidies specifically envisioned that some subsidized

349

Making It Work, supra note 11, at 12.
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guardianships might transform into subsidized adoptions.350
The number of such adoptions should be specifically tracked.
No federal legislation is required for such reforms.
Existing law provides that “[e]ach State shall submit statistical
reports as the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] may
require.”351 The Children’s Bureau should, therefore, use its
authority and insist that states provide data reflecting the new
permanency.
E.

More Rigorous Permanency Hearing Procedures to
Better Choose Between Permanency Options

Permanency
hearings
require
“momentous”
decisions.352 At these hearings, held after children have been
in foster care and not reunified for one year, courts must
answer two core questions. First, is reunification viable?
Second, if not, what is the best permanency option? This
article focuses on the second question,353 and getting it right is
essential to put children on the best path towards permanency.
The proper permanency goal can lead a case toward prompt
and decisive litigation, and avoid unnecessary litigation that
can unduly stress children and harm relationships between
adults who will remain in children’s lives. A permanency plan
decision often determines which track a case will follow. An
adoption plan will likely trigger a termination filing and
negotiations between prospective adoptive parents and
350

42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(2)(D) (2011).
42 U.S.C. § 676(b) (2008).
352
HARVEY SCHWEITZER & JUDITH LARSEN, FOSTER CARE LAW: A PRIMER
97 (2005).
353
I have previously argued that the importance of the first question—
whether reunification is viable—requires permanency hearings to be
evidentiary as a matter of due process and appealable as a matter of good
policy. Gupta-Kagan, Due Process Donut Hole, supra note 302. For
purposes of this article, I focus on cases in which reunification is not viable
and thus when only the second question—what permanency plan is best—
is the only contested issue.
351
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biological parents about any post-adoption contact or, in the
one state that currently permits it, whether a non-exclusive
adoption is best. A guardianship plan will not trigger such
litigation, but should lead relatively quickly to a guardianship
petition and negotiations between the prospective guardian
and parents about parental visitation arrangements in a
guardianship.
The permanency plan selected will shape the
negotiation dynamic tremendously between parents and a
prospective permanent caretaker—illustrating why it is so
important to select the correct permanency plan. An adoption
plan will place significant pressure on biological parents to
consent to the adoption to avoid an involuntary termination
and perhaps to win limited post-adoption contact rights—even
if the parent would prefer to fight to regain custody.
Conversely, a guardianship plan will pressure the caregivers to
agree to some post-permanency contact between parent and
child—even if the caregivers believe such contact is
detrimental to the child.
The permanency plan also serves to hold all parties
accountable for achieving a final permanency order that will
let a child leave foster care to a permanent family. Most
formally, the child welfare agency must make reasonable
efforts to achieve the permanency plan set by the court.354
Permanency plans can also serve to hold foster parents
accountable; a foster parent who says he is willing to become
an adoptive parent or guardian to a foster child should be
expected to act on that pledge reasonably promptly after a
permanency plan is changed to adoption or guardianship. If
they do not, it is an opportunity to explore any problems in the
placement or obstacles to permanency, or, if necessary, seek
out alternative placements.

354

42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (2010).
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More rigorous permanency hearings are essential. Far
too many hearings are hasty affairs with little formal evidence
or procedure, and predictably haphazard results on these
essential questions.355 When the permanency plan is contested,
these hearings should be evidentiary hearings addressing both
the viability of reunification and, if that is not viable, which
permanency option would best serve a child.356 Family courts
should use tools like pre-hearing conferences to ensure all
necessary issues will be adequately addressed in each
permanency hearing, and that all-too-common problems like a
late agency report, or an absent case worker does not delay or
prejudice the hearing.357 And permanency plan decisions
should be promptly appealable so a dispute between a
permanency plan of guardianship or adoption, or of
permanency with one foster family over another can be
promptly adjudicated.
The District of Columbia cases discussed in Part III.C
illustrate the problems which result from inadequate
permanency hearing procedures. Consider In re Ta.L. – a
permanency hearing set a plan of adoption with the nonkinship foster parents without consideration of the two
potential kinship placements that had been raised with the
child protection agency.358 Years then passed before ultimate
resolution of the dispute between the potential permanent
placements – creating an unnecessarily difficult situation for
all involved, especially the children, who lived and bonded
with the non-kinship foster parents during the litigation. More
rigorous procedures that accounted for all such options, and

355

Gupta-Kagan, Due Process Donut Hole, supra note 302.
Sarah Mullin, Reporter, Foster Care and Permanency Proceedings, 40
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 495, 500 (2007).
357
Id. at 500–01. The problem of late agency reports has long been noted,
with one commentator describing obtaining timely reports as a core
judicial task. Hardin, supra note 4, at 163.
358
Supra notes 309-314 and accompanying text.
356
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permitted expedited appeals of the decisions would prevent
the harms that such protracted litigation can cause.
One practice should be explicitly disallowed at
permanency hearings: courts should not be able to settle on a
particular permanency plan based on an abstract hierarchy
between permanency options, for all of the reasons discussed
throughout this article. Such hierarchies are particularly
dangerous at the permanency hearing stage for certain groups
of children, such as older children, and children with
disabilities. Such children are particularly likely to be subject
to an adoption disruption—being forced to leave a prospective
adoptive home before the adoption in finalized.359 The
disruption rate of pre-adoptive placements is as high as 25
percent for some subpopulations, such as older youth.360 Any
decision between whether to set a permanency plan of
adoption or guardianship should weigh the comparative
chance for a lasting placement that each option provides—and
the risk that a prospective permanent placement might disrupt.
Setting a goal of adoption for children at high risk of such
disruptions could set such children up for a harmful tour
through multiple foster homes, without any strong empirical
record to support an adoption plan. Such a path should only be
chosen after a more individualized assessment of the child’s
situation.
F.

Legal Services for Parents, Children and, When
Reunification Is Ruled Out, Caregivers

The new permanency comes to the fore of a child
protection case after a court has found the parent unfit, placed
the child in foster care, and subsequently determined that
reunification is no longer the most appropriate permanency
plan. The legal practice then becomes a form of plea
bargaining with multiple parties. The state, the parent, the
359
360

Festinger, Adoption Disruption, supra note 48, at 460.
Supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
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child and/or the child’s lawyer or best interest advocate, and
the foster parent(s) or other possible permanency resources
engage in negotiation about what permanency plan to pursue.
This practice is fundamentally different than the one
envisioned by the old permanency binary. There, lawyers are
charged with litigating a termination of parental rights case—
agency lawyers prosecute, parents’ lawyers defend, and
children’s lawyers advocate for either side depending on the
facts of the case and the wishes of their clients. Foster parents
who might become adoptive parents or guardians do not play a
role until after the core decisions are made. The new
permanency requires more complicated and nuanced
lawyering on behalf of all parties.
The work of lawyers for parents is crucial at this stage.
Parents who cannot reunify with their children have lost most
of their parental rights. But many parents will see a significant
difference in a permanency option that continues their status
as a legal parent and one that does not.361 And, regardless of
the legal status, there is a significant difference to parents in
who raises their child—even if guardianship is not possible,
many, if not most parents, will prefer adoption by someone
they know and trust to permit ongoing contact over adoption
by someone they do not trust. And in most states, even an
adoption can include a post-adoption contact agreement.
These options create an essential negotiation
opportunity for parents, which their counsel can assist with.
As in criminal plea bargaining, parents can trade their
procedural rights to contest or delay permanency in exchange
for an agreement to pursue guardianship rather than adoption,
or to agree to a formal or informal visitation agreement.362
Such agreements are not always possible, and not always good
361

On the importance of the legal title of “parent,” see Gupta-Kagan, NonExclusive Adoption, supra note 32, at Part III.A.
362
See generally, Sanger, supra note 28 (analogizing negotiating postadoption contact agreements to plea bargaining).

06 GUPTA_MACRO FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

108

UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy

3/11/2015 12:55 PM

Vol. 19:1

ideas from the perspective of different clients. Just as effective
plea bargaining (and client counseling during plea bargaining)
is now considered essential to minimally effective criminal
defense,363 permanency negotiation is an essential element of
good lawyering for parents.
What little empirical data exists on the effect of
lawyers suggests that quality parents’ lawyers will improve
permanency outcomes. In one of the rare studies to use control
and experimental groups, Mark Courtney and Jennifer Hook
found that quality parent representation caused “very
impressive” increases in the speed of achieving permanency
outcomes,364 including much faster paths to both adoption and
guardianship. The speed of finalizing adoptions increased 83
percent and guardianship speed skyrocketed 102 percent.365
We can intelligently speculate about what factors caused these
changes. First, higher quality legal representation likely helped
more parents negotiate acceptable solutions—for instance,
parents might agree to consent to a guardianship rather than
adoption, leading to a relatively quick case closure. Such
negotiations include several factors—starting with helping the
client understand in appropriate cases that reunification may
be unlikely and that their best option may be adoption or
guardianship with some contact agreement, and including
building some consensus for such options with other parties.
Second, good lawyers likely help ensure parents have
all meaningful opportunities to reunify, and that kinship
placements are adequately investigated. These steps might
lead to faster rulings against parents when they have failed to
363

Missouri v. Frye, 1342 S.Ct 1399, 1407-08 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper,
132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
364
Mark E. Courtney & Jennifer L. Hook, Evaluation of the impact of
enhanced parental legal representation on the timing of permanency
outcomes for children in foster care, 34 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERV’S REV.
1337, 1343 (2012).
365
Id. at 1340.

06 GUPTA_MACRO FINAL 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2015

The New Permanency

3/11/2015 12:55 PM

109

take advantage of those opportunities. Improved investigation
of kin would, ideally, identify kinship guardianship or
adoptive placements that facilitate faster exits from foster care.
Even if unsuccessful, improved kinship investigations could
prevent the kind of litigation challenging later adoptions that
has occurred in D.C.366 For instance, in In re Ta.L., a potential
kinship resource attended a family team meeting at the
beginning of the case, yet was never contacted by the agency;
the parent’s lawyer should have counseled her client about the
value of pursuing a kinship placement and advocated with the
agency to place the children with kin – and, if necessary,
presented a case for establishing a permanency goal with that
kinship placement at the permanency hearing.
Children’s lawyers are essential for many of the same
reasons. When reunification is not possible, children’s lawyers
should often seek negotiated solutions that will achieve
permanency for their clients through a legal status that meets
their client’s individual wishes and family circumstances, and
when possible avoids unnecessary risks from litigation itself.
Such negotiation has long been recognized as part of
children’s lawyer’s jobs,367 and so has representation after an
initial disposition as the parties work towards permanency for
foster children.368 Throughout a case, children’s lawyers
should serve as a check on agency discretion—including,
when necessary, challenging agency decisions regarding
kinship placements and permanency plans. Many children’s
lawyers already fulfill this role, which is one reason research

366

Supra Part III.B.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS
WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 10 (1996),
available
at
https://www.afccnet.org/Portals/0/
PublicDocuments/Guidelines/AbuseNeglectStandards.pdf.
368
Id. at 14.
367
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has shown that such lawyers expedite permanency for their
clients.369
Finally, an important role can be played by counsel for
prospective adoptive parents and guardians – after a court has
ruled that a child protection agency should no longer work
towards reunification. Foster parents and other potential
permanency resources have important roles in planning for
foster children’s future – after all, if a foster parent is willing
to pursue guardianship but not adoption, or vice versa, that
should affect the selection of a permanency plan and litigation
steps following that plan. Recognizing the role of foster
parents, ASFA required that they be provided notice and an
opportunity to be heard in court hearings.370 And
commentators have long called for foster parents to have a
strong voice in permanency planning and for agency
caseworkers to build trust with foster parents more effectively
and meaningfully engage them in important decisions.371
Yet much reason for caution exists when considering
counsel for foster parents. Most cases lead to reunification,
and counsel for foster parents—especially foster parents
interested in serving as adoptive parents or guardians—could
impede that process. Foster parents should be expected to
assist with reunification, especially in early stages of a case.
Moreover, any rights that foster parents have are
369

See, e.g., ANDREW ZINN & JACK SLOWRIVER, EXPEDITING
PERMANENCY: LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR FOSTER CHILDREN IN PALM
BEACH COUNTY, CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN AT THE
UNIVERSITY
OF
CHICAGO
14-15
(2008),
available
at
http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/old_reports/428.pdf (finding
that legal representation for children correlates with significantly higher
rates of permanency, especially adoption and long-term custody, which is
equivalent to guardianship).
370
Pub. L. 105-89, § 104 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(G) (2000)).
371
E.g., SCHWEITZER & LARSEN, supra 351, at 38–39; Sandra Stukes
Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of
Contemporary Foster Care, 14 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 75, 85–86 (2004).
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constitutionally subordinate to the rights of parents and
children.372 Providing foster parents with counsel is therefore
inappropriate when the court has ordered parties to work
towards reunification.
But when a court changes a child’s permanency plan
away from reunification,373 the foster parent is in a delicate
position calling for independent advice. The court, the agency,
the child’s lawyer (and the child, if s/he understands the legal
status of their case), and the parent will look to the foster
parent for an indication of the foster parent’s willingness to
pursue permanency, and if so, through what legal status. If the
foster parent is not interested, the agency will seek to recruit
someone else. If the foster parent is interested, the parties will
seek either a negotiated or litigated solution. Foster parents
need independent advice at this stage for multiple purposes.
The foster parent should know which permanency option
might best serve their goals, and would benefit from
counseling regarding the best means to obtain that
permanency option, including the likely results of negotiation
and litigation. This decision-making is precisely the type of
confidential counseling that good lawyers provide.374
Unfortunately, existing law is not structured to provide
such attorneys. Federal financing statutes provide state
agencies with $2,000 to support the costs of finalizing
guardianships (at least those eligible for subsidies under

372

Smith v. Org. of Foster Fam. for Eq. & Ref., 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
This statement presumes, of course, that rigorous procedures described
in Part IV.G are followed, and permanency plan changes are subject to
expedited appellate review.
374
Other possibilities exist. Child protection agencies could create
divisions of social workers to advise foster parents on permanency options,
for instance. But such workers, as agency employees, could not be truly
independent. Or local bar associations could organize pro bono attorneys to
provide brief advice and counseling to foster parents.
373
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existing federal law) and adoptions—costs that frequently
include counsel.375
State courts should make a practice of appointing
attorneys for foster parents who are considering becoming
adoptive parents or guardians if the court has changed a
child’s permanency plan away from reunification. This will
ensure such parties are aware of all permanency options and
pursue one that achieves what they think best for the child.
V.

Conclusion

The new permanency holds great promise. A range of
permanency options can improve permanency outcomes by,
first, helping more foster children leave temporary state
custody to live with legally permanent families. Second, it can
give those families (including the permanent caregiver, the
child, and the biological parents) choices for the best legal
status that fits their situation—they can determine how
important it is to have the legal title of “parent,” and what
ongoing contact between the parent and child would be best.
Third, it can reduce the number of unnecessary terminations
and the legal orphans that such terminations create.
These outcomes require more reforms than existing
efforts have created. They require accepting the powerful
research showing all options on the permanency continuum as
equally lasting, and letting that conclusion guide statutory
reforms and agency practices. They require recognizing the
connection between kinship placements and permanency, and
prioritizing kinship care early in a case. They require changing
child welfare’s professional culture to value all forms of
375

These costs are deemed “nonrecurring” expenses in federal law and are
explicitly envisioned to include legal fees for adoptions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 673(a)(6)(A) (2011). Similar provisions exist for guardianships. Id. at
§ 673(d)(1)(B)(iv). See also, e.g., CODE OF MD. REGS. § 07.02.12.151(C)(2)(a) (providing “one-time-only subsidy is deigned to cover . . . legal
costs”).
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permanency equally, and empowering families (and not only
agencies) to choose among the various permanency options.
They require more rigorous procedures to reach the best
decisions early in a case and provide a strong check on agency
discretion. These reforms are all possible, and strongly
implied by the steps already taken to create the permanency
continuum.

